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1.1 Growing importance of credit ratings 
Partnoy (2006, 61) compresses the paradox of the existence of credit ratings as follows: 
 
“Rating changes are important, yet they possess little informational value. Credit rat-
ings do not help parties manage risk, yet parties increasingly rely on ratings. Credit 
rating agencies are not widely respected among sophisticated market participants, yet 
their franchise is increasingly valuable. The agencies argue that they are merely fi-
nancial journalists publishing opinions, yet ratings are far more valuable than the 
opinions of even the most prominent and respected financial publishers.” 
 
Since the beginning of the rating industry, people have raised questions about the ex-
istence of credit ratings. This is certainly not surprising. In just one century the industry 
has managed to grow huge in size and has created a strong regulatory barrier for new-
comers to enter into the market. This has kept the number of rating agencies rather small 
through years. The major participants dominating the industry with a market share of 
some 95 percent, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings, 
have been around since the inception of the industry. (White 2010) 
A matter of concern is the fact that the whole financial system is crucially dependent 
on credit ratings. Credit ratings, among other things, ameliorate information asymmetry 
between issuers and investors, as well as are heavily used in financial regulation (Rhee 
2015, 162–163). Thus, although credit ratings are argued to be merely publishing opin-
ions of financial journalists, they are not absolutely consumed as those (Partnoy 2006). 
As ratings are produced by humans, mistakes and conflicts of interest can never fully be 
avoided. This, and the oligopolistic industry created with the help of regulators, naturally 
raises problems and criticism. 
The debate has been especially vigorous over the 21st century. There are several rea-
sons explaining this. First, everyone remembers the worn-out examples of Enron and 
WorldCom which received fine ratings just before their collapses in the beginning of the 
century. Second, rating agencies are blamed for playing a key role in the 2007–2008 fi-
nancial crisis due to their inadequate performance, mostly related to structured debt prod-
ucts (see e.g. Pagano & Volpino 2010). Besides, during the crisis even a larger set of 
investment grade companies were graded to junk shortly before defaulting. 
Structured debt obligations are a good example of a new area in the world of finance 
that requires high expertise to understand the content. Thus, it is no wonder that a growing 
amount of income for rating agencies has recently come from this source (Pagano & 
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Volpino 2010, 407–408). However, as the case of collateral debt obligations during the 
crisis reveals, it was challenging for even experts of rating agencies do deal with the com-
plex content of these securities. 
After the financial crisis, began the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010–2012. Dur-
ing this time, European Union officials blamed rating downgrades for accelerating the 
crisis (CFR 2015). Sovereign ratings in Europe are surely not the only source of debate 
over the last years. Few would have guessed that it would be possible to downgrade the 
rating of the United States federal government, until S&P reduced the rating from “out-
standing” to “excellent” in 2011. It is curious that in the current financial system this kind 
of power has been given mainly to three private companies. These same firms give ratings 
from small singular securities to entire nations. 
The recent debate on credit ratings has been closely related to banks. After the financial 
crisis, popular indignation many times focused on credit ratings assigned to banks that 
enjoyed good ratings just before defaulting. Likewise, the problematic structured debt 
obligations were sold by banks. Credit ratings are also in the core of banking regulation 
as they can be used to determine how much capital banks need to hold in order to cover 
their credit risk. Basel II, the second and the recent implementation of the international 
bank regulatory framework reform by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, has 
since been criticized for increasing the reliance on external credit ratings. (Hau, Langfield 
& Marques-Ibanez 2013, 291–292, 296). In response, the still ongoing development of 
Basel III is aiming to reduce this reliance and has announced proposals for alternatives 
methods to measure bank credit risk (e.g. BCBS 2015). Anyhow, because of substantial 
negative feedback that some of these proposals have received from banks using external 
ratings, it seems that external credit ratings will also have a place in banking regulation 
in the future, at least to some extent. 
As the dominance of the Big Three rating agencies and the systemic importance of 
credit ratings are likely to continue also in the future, the question whether rating agencies 
do in fact provide accurate and new information on the market is interesting. Due to the 
substantial amount of criticism ratings have attracted, there exists many research papers 
studying these questions in form or another. For example, rating agencies are criticized 
about moving too slowly and their ratings are said to be too inflexible (Altman & Saun-
ders 2001, 6). A recent study of Hau et al. (2013) reveals that differential risk weights 
recommended by the Basel regulation have no significant relationship to empirical default 
probabilities in the case of investment grade banks. In other words, if two banks are given 
upscale ratings, such as AAA and BBB, they must hold different amounts of capital to 
cover their credit risk even though their credit ratings may not reveal any information of 
the probability of future default. Besides, the authors find some evidence that on average 
large banks receive more positive ratings compared to smaller ones. If these findings are 
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true, the use of external credit ratings is obviously not the ideal way to calculate bank risk 
weights as it brings inequality and bias to the system. 
One stream of credit rating studies investigates the market response to rating an-
nouncements. These studies generally concentrate on bond and stock prices and most 
recently on credit default swap spreads. Despite some of the more contradictory and 
mixed study results, the trend among these studies seems to be that the market reacts 
asymmetrically to the announcements of rating upgrades and downgrades. This is espe-
cially true in the case of stock prices. While rating downgrades are typically associated 
with significantly negative abnormal returns, the reaction among rating upgrades is often 
more limited or insignificant (e.g. Holthausen & Leftwich 1986; Hand, Holthausen & 
Leftwich 1992; Goh & Ederington 1993; Fieberg, Körner, Prokop & Varmaz 2015). 
In the past, stock market studies have mainly concentrated on the United States market 
(e.g. Pinches & Singleton 1978; Holthausen & Leftwich 1986). Since the 1990s papers 
from other markets have also started to show up (e.g. Matolcsy & Lianto 1995; Elayan, 
Hsu & Meyer 2003). Still, there is a smaller amount of papers using European stock mar-
ket data. Besides, only few papers focus directly on banking industry (see e.g. Gropp & 
Richards 2001; Fieberg et al. 2015). This is a somewhat surprising taking into account 
the central role of the industry. Thus, further research in this area is relevant, in order to 
explore whether the results match with studies using data from other markets. 
1.2  Study objective 
The main objective of this study is to examine the short-term effect of credit rating an-
nouncements on daily stock returns for European banks indexed in STOXX Europe 600 
Banks. This is conducted by deriving relevant research hypotheses from previous litera-
ture. These hypotheses are formed to explore: 
 whether rating announcements have an effect on stock returns 
 when this possible reaction occurs 
 whether the reaction is asymmetric between rating upgrades and downgrades. 
These hypotheses are answered by conducting an event study, which is a common 
statistical methodology used in this research field. Besides the main hypotheses, a variety 
of additional tests are conducted to investigate other potential determinants of the returns 
surrounding rating changes. The set of additional tests includes typical issues and deter-
minants studied in this research area. Credit rating announcements are gathered from the 
beginning of 2002 till the end of 2015 and represent issuer ratings produced by S&P, 
Moody’s and Fitch. 
To the knowledge of the author, there have not been any recent published academic 
papers examining stock price effects of credit rating announcements particularly on the 
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European banking sector. Probably the latest paper with a similar focus was conducted 
by Gropp and Richards (2001). However, their sample size was smaller and they did not 
run as many additional tests as is done in this thesis. Anyhow, there is one very recent 
and comprehensive paper conducted by Fieberg et al. (2015) who used a broad banks-
specific sample from 76 countries worldwide. Thus, their focus on the banking sector is 
much more universal. Besides, they mainly focus on how the size of a bank and the out-
break of the subprime crisis affect the results. Inspired by them, these two issues are also 
paid attention to in this thesis, although on a smaller scale. 
All in all, the majority of event studies concerning stock price effects of credit rating 
changes focus on the United States market using data from several industries. Corre-
sponding studies using European, and specifically industry-specific data, are less com-
mon. The banking sector is especially interesting due to its unique characteristics related 
to high regulation, opaqueness and global systemic importance. 
This study unites both, Europe and the banking sector, providing evidence on whether 
bank stocks are affected by rating announcements in the European context. European 
economies provide a heterogeneous environment which is much more bank driven, if 
compared, for example, to the United States market. In the United States it is easier to get 
funding outside the commercial banking system leading to a situation where bonds, and 
thus credit ratings, play a more significant role in the financial system (Cancian 2016). 
These fundamental differences between the United States and Europe are likely to be seen 
in the stock price reaction of credit rating announcements. 
Although this thesis has mainly theoretical contributions to the existing literature, it 
may provide some useful abnormal return information for investors interested in the Eu-
ropean bank market. After all, if credit rating announcements do provide pricing pertinent 
information, it could be used in trading strategies. On the other hand, bank executives 
might be interested whether rating announcements have any short-term impact on bank 
market values. 
1.3 Event study methodology 
To explore whether credit rating announcements do produce new information on the mar-
ket, a standard event study approach is used in this thesis. An event study is a statistical 
method used to study the effect of a specific event on the value of a company using fi-
nancial market data. Event study methodology has been one of the most common used 
tools in financial research in the past decades due to its simplicity, although, there appears 
to be some criticism as well (Wells 2004, 61, 66). 
Event studies have a long history in academic research. Presumably the first published 
event study was conducted by Dolley in 1933 who studied price effects of stock splits. 
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However, the first more well-known and more groundbreaking event studies in academia 
were conducted in the late 1960s by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, Fisher, Jensen & 
Roll (1969). Ball and Brown studied the information content of earnings and Fama et al. 
examined the effect of stock splits after removing dividend increases. These two research 
papers introduced the event study methodology which basically follows the same princi-
ples as studies conducted today. (MacKinlay 1997, 14) 
Over the next decades, event studies became a common tool in various research areas 
and has had numerous methodological applications and extensions. Besides methodolog-
ical development, a remarkable matter for event study methodology has been the increas-
ing availability of daily data (and sometimes intraday) instead of monthly data. The meth-
odology differs between short-term and long-term event studies. While short-time event 
studies try to explore the price behavior around the event days, long-term studies investi-
gate how the events affect the prices over long periods of time, generally the event win-
dow being one year or more. Long-term event studies are shown to be less reliable in 
general due to the amount of their limitations. For instance, long-horizon tests are highly 
susceptible to the joint-test problem and have lower power. (Kothari & Warner 2004, 8–
9). 
 Event studies dominate the empirical research especially in the area of corporate fi-
nance (MacKinlay 1997, 36). One of the most common examples is to study the effects 
of financial decisions on the value of the company that is often done by using returns. 
Besides returns, trading volume and volatility are sometimes used in the area of finance 
and accounting. Typical events include, for example, mergers and acquisitions activity, 
earnings announcements, capital structure changes, dividend changes and credit rating 
changes. Event studies also serve a significant purpose in capital market research as they 
are used to test market efficiency. Nonzero abnormal security returns are inconsistent 
with market efficiency if they systematically persist after a particular type of corporate 
event (Kothari and Warner 2004). Besides finance, accounting and economics, event 
studies are also conducted in disciplines, such as, management, marketing, law, history 
and political science (Corrado 2011, 207). Due to the versatile properties of the method-
ology, it can be easily modified to any research problem where the effects of a specified 
event are studied on time series. 
In this thesis the event study is used to statistically test whether an economic event has 
an impact on the value of a firm using financial market data. This is done by separating 
the effect of the event from other market movements to get the pure influence of the event. 
This difference between the realized return and the expected return is called the abnormal 
return. The abnormal return may be either positive or negative and it simply implies how 
the security has performed over a given period of time. After determining the abnormal 
return, there are two ways to proceed with the study. The first method is more traditional 
in which the statistical significance of abnormal returns is tested individually each day or 
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cumulative. The other approach is to identify variables that should explain the reaction. 
This is done by using a regression analysis to get the parameter values for each variable 
explaining the effect. 
Conducting an event study includes the following steps: 
1. defining the research hypotheses 
2. defining the dates upon which the market has received the news associated with 
the events 
3. collecting time series data 
4. estimating the expected returns for each firm using the data outside the event 
days 
5. calculating the abnormal returns 
6. testing the statistical and economical significance for the specified hypotheses. 
The more technical aspects of conducting an event study, including the methodological 
choices and the data used in this thesis, are further introduced in Chapter 4. 
1.4 Thesis structure 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 will introduce the frame-
work and previous literature on the subject to get an insight what is done in this study. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first one focuses on the credit rating in-
dustry and is divided into five subsections. The first subsection gives a brief introduction 
of the history and the current state of the credit rating industry. This information is given 
to better understand the nature of the industry and to perceive why the Big Three agencies 
have been chosen for this study. The second subsection is the most theoretical one as it 
explains reasons for the existence of credit ratings. The third subsection introduces rating 
types and scales. The information provided by this section is vital to understand the data 
used in this thesis. The next subsection describes the rating process. After all, to be able 
to question the quality of ratings, one must know the process every rating has to go 
through before publishing. As already presented in the introductory section, there exists 
plenty of criticism concerning ratings. The fifth and the final subsection opens up these 
aspects of criticism further. Previous research on the topic is often based on criticism 
about ratings and exists to increase information and to offer possible solutions to prob-
lems. 
The second section of Chapter 2 introduces features of the banking sector and why 
credit ratings are closely related to banks. This section consists of three subsections. The 
first one specifies the unique characteristics of the banking sector. Taking into consider-
ation the theme of this thesis, the results concerning regulated financial companies may 
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be different compared with other industries. The idea of the second subsection is to de-
scribe how credit ratings are used in banking regulation. This includes the introduction of 
the Basel framework. As this study is conducted using bank data and ratings serve a spe-
cial purpose in banking regulation, this subsection should give further motivation to study 
the features of credit ratings. The third subsection concentrates on the characteristics of 
the European banking sector as it is the matter of focus in this study. 
Finally the third section of Chapter 2 introduces the previous research on the investi-
gation of the market reaction of rating announcements. This section will begin with a 
brief introduction of the research field. The second subsection gives a few examples of 
studies concerning debt market reaction. Although these studies are not directly related 
to the topic of this thesis, a majority of previous research focuses on debt market reaction 
including corporate and sovereign debt as well as credit default swaps. Thus, it is of use 
to briefly introduce this topic. Besides, there are similarities between the responsiveness 
of debt and stock markets. The third and the fourth subsections focus on stock market 
reaction. The third subsection gives an overall view of what has been studied. In order to 
make this part more convenient to read, the study results are emphasized, instead of data 
and methodological choices. The last subsection concentrates on banks. The included 
study results are explained in more details depending on how relevant the concerned study 
is for this thesis. 
Chapter 3 introduces the research hypotheses based on the literature used in research 
for this thesis. Besides the main hypotheses, this chapter explains what types of additional 
tests are conducted to investigate potential determinants surrounding rating changes.  
Chapter 4 describes the empirical methodology and choices as well as the data. The first 
part of the chapter includes the details of the conducted event study and cross-sectional 
regression analysis. Also, some problems and limitations related to this study and event 
studies in general are introduced. The end of the chapter gives details of the data. 
The results of the research are presented in Chapter 5. The fifth chapter is further di-
vided into two sections: credit rating changes and credit rating watches. The results con-
cerning rating downgrades and upgrades are introduced separately in both sections. Chap-
ter 6 summarizes and concludes the thesis. 
14 
2 THEORY AND LITERATURE 
2.1 Credit rating industry 
2.1.1 Development and current state of the industry 
The credit rating industry is just about a century old, as the capital market was originally 
developed without rating agencies (see e.g. Sylla 2001). The rating industry has grown 
especially during the past few decades and has played a key role in the financial world, 
providing tools for investor to measure creditworthiness of various financial instruments.  
The beginning of the industry originates in the United States in the early twentieth 
century. The prior small-scale credit reporting was not enough to satisfy the rising need 
for information that was derived from the expansive growth of the bond market. This 
expansion resulted mainly from the construction of extensive railroad systems which was 
primarily financed by corporate bonds. (Sylla 2001, 6–7) 
The first security ratings were published by Moody’s in 1909. Moody’s provided a 
single rating symbol for each security to make complex data reports more user-friendly. 
In the next few years, Moody’s encountered competition from Poor’s Publishing Com-
pany in 1916, Standard Statistics Company in 1922 and the Fitch Publishing Company in 
1924. Later Poor’s Publishing Company and Standard Statistics Company merged to be-
come Standard & Poor’s in 1941. Although additional rating agencies were formed in the 
following years, these three original companies have dominated the industry to this date. 
(White 2010, 211) 
During the industry’s first decades, credit ratings were sold to investors. However, in 
the early 1970s this business model changed among the major rating agencies. In the new 
model, the issuer, instead of the investor, pays the rating agency for a rating. There have 
been multiple suggestions to explain this change. One plausible explanation could be the 
spreading of the high-speed photocopy machine. This caused the free rider problem, as it 
was easy to share the information once produced by a rating firm. Other explanations 
include, for example, the default of Penn-Central Railroad in 1970 that damaged the long 
period of economic stability. This shocked the bond markets and started a liquidity crisis 
that might have been a reason for debt issuers to want to pay for rating firms to ensure 
their ratings. Nevertheless, the introduction of the new “issuer pays” business model cre-
ated potential conflicts of interest to the system as most agencies were, and still are, paid 
by the same firms they get ratings from. (White 2010, 214–215). 
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The usage of credit ratings in regulation began in the 1930s when bank regulators de-
cided to encourage banks to invest only in safe bonds. In 1936 a decree was set that pro-
hibited banks from investing below investment grade bonds. The following years also 
marked the beginning of the use of credit ratings in insurance regulation. Insurance com-
panies got to face new minimum capital requirements in their investment strategies and 
these requirements were geared to credit ratings. Also federal pension regulators followed 
a similar strategy. The ratings used in financial regulation had to be determined by “rec-
ognized ratings manuals”, meaning only S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. (White 2010, 212–
214) 
The next target group to face rating-related minimum capital requirements were bro-
ker-dealers in 1970s. These included major investment banks and securities firms. How-
ever, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was not satisfied with the vague 
definition of “recognized ratings manuals” and created a new category – “nationally rec-
ognized statistical rating organization” (NRSRO). Originally the SEC gave the title only 
to S&P, Moody’s and Fitch and stated that NRSROs are the only companies to give valid 
ratings used in broker-dealers regulation. Soon the category of NRSRO was also adopted 
by other financial regulators. The creation of NRSROs has been seen as one of the major 
events influencing the industry. It created a regulatory barrier for newcomers to enter into 
the market, which has kept the number of rating agencies rather small through years. 
(White 2010, 212–214) 
Besides the creation of the NRSRO category, there are also other reasons which ex-
plain the concentration of the industry, such as; economies of scale, the advantages of 
experience and the brand name reputation (White 2010, 217). These features altogether 
make it extremely difficult for a new rating firm to enter into the market. Most newcomers 
concentrate on a small market sector in order to be able to start building their own repu-
tation in that specialized area. 
The credit rating industry has remained oligopolistic in its entire existence and the 
current market structure seems to remain stable, also in the future. The total revenue by 
all of the NRSROs for their 2014 fiscal year was approximately $5.9 billion (SEC 2015, 
17). The two biggest agencies today, Standard & Poor's and Moody's Investors Service, 
control about 40 percent of the global market share each. The combined market share 
when taking Fitch Ratings also into consideration has been around 95 percent (White 
2010, 216–217). This leaves the role of other rating agencies very marginal in the global 
scale. There were ten credit rating agencies registered as NRSROs by the end of year 
2015. The following table lists the names, origins and their primary business areas. Inter-
estingly enough, the SEC has given NRSRO status to three foreign companies yet none 
of them are European. 
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Table 1 Nationally recognized statistical rating organizations in 2015 (SEC 2015) 
Name Origin Primary area of focus 
A.M. Best Company, Inc. US Insurance 
DBRS, Inc. Canada Canada 
Egan-Jones Ratings Company US US 
Fitch Ratings, Inc. US Global 
HR Ratings de México, S.A. de C.V Mexico Mexico 
Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd. Japan Japan 
Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. US Financial companies 
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. US Global 
Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC US Structured finance 
Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services US Global 
 
There is also a great amount of credit rating agencies that are not registered as NRS-
ROs. The total amount of rating agencies around the world in 2010 was approximately 
150. There are several dimensions to how the agencies differ from each other: business 
focus, rating methodology, pricing model and the type of scale. The three major agencies 
follow a similar pattern as they all have a global focus and provide cross-industry, issuer 
and instrument specific ratings. They have an analytical approach with committee report-
ing, follow an issuer-pays business model and use ordinal scales. All three major agencies 
have a solid, strong reputation. Investors do not commonly make radical presumptions on 
which of the companies performs best and in some markets it is a common habit to auto-
matically take ratings from two or three agencies. (Langohr & Langohr 2010, 384–389). 
As choosing a major agency is the rule rather than an exception, the focus will be on these 
three companies for the rest of the paper.  
Standard & Poor’s Rating Services is the largest of the three major agencies today 
based on its market share. It is a part of Standard & Poor's Financial Services that is a 
subsidiary of McGraw Hill Financial. Moody's Investors Service was owned by Dun & 
Bradstreet for many decades and became a separate company in 2000. Moody’s Investors 
Service is now owned by Moody’s Corporation. Unlike S&P and Fitch, Moody’s Corpo-
ration is a free-standing company. Fitch Ratings is the smallest of the three major agencies 
when comparing their market shares. Fitch Ratings is a part of the Fitch Group that is 
nowadays a jointly owned subsidiary of Hearst Corporation and FIMALAC. Fitch Group 
is the result of a complex series of mergers and acquisitions unlike S&P and Moody’s 
that have grown more organically. (SEC 2015; White 2010, 211) 
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The percentage of outstanding credit ratings of total ratings issued by NRSROs was 
nearly 49 percent for S&P in 2014, the total amount of ratings being 2.4 million. As com-
parison, for Moody’s the same number was about 35 percent and for Fitch 12 percent. 
The amount of financial institutions of the total ratings produced by NRSROs was roughly 
8 percent. (SEC 2015, 10–12). 
For the rest of the paper, names S&P, Moody’s and Fitch are used to refer to the three 
major rating agencies, not to their holding companies. When referring to the firms to-
gether, the term “Big Three” is used. 
2.1.2 Functions of credit ratings 
Credit rating agencies try to make it clear that ratings are not buy or sell recommenda-
tions, nor are they a guarantee that default will not occur. Ratings always represent 
agency’s own opinions of the credit quality and the investor should always make an in-
dependent analysis of the creditworthiness of the assets and not lean solely on the rating. 
(see e.g. Fitch Ratings 2016). Taking this into consideration, it is not surprising that since 
the inception of rating agencies, people have raised questions about the existence and the 
role of the industry. 
There is a strong market rationale for the existence of rating agencies. Two standard 
theories state that (1) rating agencies ameliorate information asymmetry between issuers 
and investors and (2) rating agencies reduce the cost of regulation. Information asym-
metry refers to a situation where one party has more or better information than the other. 
In the case of financial markets, borrowers know more about their creditworthiness than 
creditors. This results in a situation where creditors raise rates for protection against lower 
quality borrowers driving higher quality borrowers out of the market. In economic litera-
ture this is called the “lemon” problem. Rating agencies are said to correct the problem 
as they act as an information intermediary producing independent information on the bor-
rower’s creditworthiness. (Rhee 2015, 162–163). 
The other common explanation for the existence of rating agencies is that they exist 
because they reduce the net cost of regulation as investors and regulators do not have to 
erect an analytic infrastructure to analyze bond investments (Rhee 2015, 164). The use of 
credit ratings in financial regulation has grown in importance since the introduction of 
NRSROs in the 1970s. Nowadays states worldwide use credit ratings for protection 
against systematic risk. By preventing the accumulation of too much risk at certain points 
in the financial system, states aim for financial stability in order to increase confidence 
between all participants. (Dittrich 2007, 15). Even though the use of ratings in regulation 
is prevalent around the world, it is still most widespread in the United Sates. Compared 
with the United States, the rating-based regulation is much less common on the European 
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level. Although several European nations use credit rating standards for similar purposes 
as the United States, the number of means of use does not come anywhere close to what 
it is in the States. (Langohr & Langohr 2010, 431) 
In his study, Dittrich (2007) gives four practical points of view on why credit ratings 
are ideal instruments in financial regulation: 
1. Credit ratings have proven to be efficient in their high correlation between risk 
categories and default rates. 
2. Credit ratings are readily available to all market participants at no direct cost. 
3. The need for continued detailed oversight can be kept at a minimum by matching 
market recognition and regulatory recognition of rating agencies. 
4. Ratings are based on reputation and thoroughness, making them an ideal instru-
ment to increase confidence. 
According to Dittrich, these reasons altogether make ratings a rather simple instrument to 
influence the behavior of financial market participants. 
According to Adams, Mathieson and Schinasi (1999, 200) rating-based regulation can 
be divided into three areas that are investment restrictions, disclosure requirements and 
capital requirements. Probably the most extensive use of ratings has been the investment 
restrictions on regulated institutions. These restrictions include prohibiting investments 
on low-rated or unrated securities to reduce the riskiness of the overall portfolio. Ratings 
are also used to define disclosure and issuance requirements. An adequate credit rating 
may lower legislative obligations. Ratings may also be a requirement for issuing certain 
types of securities. The last category covers all rules concerning capital requirements that 
are given to financial institutions in order to prevent financial market instability. 
According to Rhee (2015), the two common theories stating that rating agencies ame-
liorate information asymmetry and reduce the cost of regulation do not fully answer the 
question of why credit ratings exist. In his study he suggests an alternative explanation. 
Even though rating agencies produce little new information to the market, they are needed 
to sort out the large volume of information in the credit market. This sorting function 
facilitates better credit analysis and investment selection and it cannot easily be replicated. 
Langohr and Langohr (2010, 89–91) for their part give three more functional purposes 
of what credit ratings are for. First, credit ratings objectively measure the credit risk of 
the issuer’s business and its debt financing. This resolves the aforementioned problem of 
information asymmetry. The second function is to provide a means of comparison be-
tween all issues of the credit risks embedded in them. This gives the investors the oppor-
tunity to compare the credit risk between all possible types of issues. The third function 
is that ratings provide market participants with a common standard to refer to credit risk. 
This means that a rating is public and all parties in a contract can observe it, and 
acknowledge the level of it, in the same way at any point of time. 
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In general, credit ratings simply make it easier for lenders and borrowers to face each 
other. Investors need information on the quality of their investments and issuers for their 
part need access to funds. Credit ratings reduce the cost of information for investors, and 
the cost of market access for issuers. (Langohr and Langohr 2010, 89–91). It is also good 
to perceive that without rating agencies, small and less informed investors might be left 
out of the market as they may not have the skills and resources to come up with necessary 
information to make investment decisions. 
2.1.3 Rating types and scales 
A credit rating could be generally defined as a method of measuring the creditworthiness 
of a debt issuer. It can be assigned to any entity that seeks to borrow money. This could 
be an individual, corporation, state or provincial authority or a sovereign government. 
Besides external credit ratings that are provided by external rating agencies such as S&P, 
Moody’s and Fitch, many financial institutions have their own internal rating systems to 
represent the creditworthiness of their clients. These internal ratings (a.k.a. credit score) 
are for institution’s personal use only and should not be confused with regulated external 
ratings. 
There are different types of credit ratings that rating agencies produce. First, ratings 
can be divided into short-term and long-term credit ratings. Ratings express the likelihood 
that the borrower will go into default within a given time period. A short-term rating 
reflects the likelihood of the rated party defaulting within a year and a long-term rating 
over longer term. In the past long-term ratings have been more preferred but recently 
short-term ratings have become the norm as well. (Investopedia 2016) 
Second, agencies produce issuer-specific ratings and issue-specific ratings. An issuer 
rating rates the issuer as a whole – it provides an overall assessment of a firm’s credit-
worthiness. In contrast, an issue rating, also known as an instrument rating, deals with the 
performance of one particular debt instrument. Naturally issuer and instrument ratings are 
never fully independent of each other. (Langohr & Langohr 2010, 42–43). When, for in-
stance, news journalists give credit rating disclosures, it is not always clearly specified 
which type of a rating is in question. For example, it is not necessarily an issuer rating 
that is changed when a company’s credit rating is informed to be changed in the news. 
This may cause confusion. 
Third, ratings are divided into local and foreign currency ratings. This refers to con-
siderations of country and currency risk. Local currency ratings measure the likelihood 
of repayment in the currency of the jurisdiction. Foreign currency rating additionally con-
siders the profile of the issuer after taking into account transfer and convertibility risk. 
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Both foreign currency and local currency ratings are internationally comparable assess-
ments. (Fitch Ratings 2016a). 
Different rating agencies use their own variation of an alphabetical combination of 
lower and upper-case letters to summarize their opinions about obligors in ratings. Plus 
and minus signs or numbers are further added to tune the ratings. In this thesis the focus 
is on long-term issuer-specific ratings provided by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. They all use 
ordinal credit rating scales that are categorized in Table 2. Even though the scales of these 
three companies look somewhat similar, it is good to keep in mind that each rating agency 
has its own definition of a credit rating. Thus, absolute linkage between the symbols be-
tween the different companies cannot be defined because the symbols do not measure the 
same thing (Watson 2006, 187). Ratings produced by S&P and Fitch measure the proba-
bility of default although their methods of analysis differ from each other. Moody’s, on 
the other hand, is interested in the expected financial loss, not in default probability per 
se. However, considering the aim of this study, there is no need to further distinguish 
between different rating scales. 
Table 2 Long-term issuer-specific rating classes 
 Moody's S&P Fitch Rating description 
Investment grade 
Aaa AAA AAA Prime 
Aa1 AA+ AA+ 
High grade Aa2 AA AA 
Aa3 AA− AA− 
A1 A+ A+ 
Upper medium grade A2 A A 
A3 A− A− 
Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 
Lower medium grade Baa2 BBB BBB 
Baa3 BBB− BBB− 
Non-investment grade  
(a.k.a. speculative grade) 
Ba1 BB+ BB+ 
Non-investment grade 
speculative 
Ba2 BB BB 
Ba3 BB− BB− 
B1 B+ B+ 
Highly speculative B2 B B 
B3 B− B− 
Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ 
Substantial risks Caa2 CCC CCC 
Caa3 CCC− CCC− 
Ca CC CC Extremely speculative 
Ca C C Default imminent 
C R RD 
In default / SD D 
/ D / 
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The rating scales in Table 2 measure the credit risk on a risk index and not an absolute 
measure. This means that B rated instruments are more likely to default than the A rated 
ones, but it does not give information on how much more or how much less likely (ordinal 
scale). (Langohr & Langohr 2010, 44). The most visible threshold, which is also used in 
regulation, is the line between the investment grade ratings and the speculative grade rat-
ings. Other sub-categories are seldom used and their verbal descriptions vary. A non-
investment grade bond is often called a junk bond in spoken language to refer to its higher 
default risk. 
Besides issuer and instrument ratings, rating agencies also publish rating watches and 
outlooks to indicate the likely direction of a rating in the future. When a company is on 
the watch, it indicates that there is a heightened probability of a rating change in the short-
term. The direction of the possible change may also be informed but it is not necessary. 
After a rating has been upgraded, downgraded or confirmed, it is removed from the watch. 
It is good to notice that the rating does not have to be placed on the watch list before the 
change takes place. (Fitch Ratings 2016b). A rating watch (Fitch) is also known as a credit 
watch (S&P) or a rating review (Moody’s) depending on the agency. In this study the 
term rating watch is used as a synonym to refer to all of these short-term direction reviews. 
The outlook is somewhat similar to the rating watch as it also indicates the direction a 
rating is likely to move to in the future. The main difference, however, is the time-horizon 
as the outlook indicates the likelihood of a rating to move over a one- to two-year period. 
Thus, outlooks reflect financial and other trends that may affect the ratings in the future. 
The direction of the possible change is also usually stated. The majority of outlooks are 
generally designated as stable. Just like in the case of rating watches, any given outlook 
does not imply that the rating will necessarily change. (Fitch Ratings 2016b) 
2.1.4 Rating process 
Rating agencies put their reputation on the line every time they give a new rating. Thus a 
new rating action is a high-risk decision for an agency. To be able to give a high-quality 
and accurate rating, every rating goes through a comprehensive process that focuses on 
objectivity, diligence and transparency. The rating process itself tends to be quite similar 
between rating agencies. Also, the largest agencies seem to follow similar procedures for 
similar types of instruments. (Langohr & Langohr 2010, 161, 187). Nevertheless, the 
quantitative and qualitative factors vary between companies and debt instruments. Some 
rating agencies are quite open in their rating procedures. For example, Moody’s publishes 
methodology descriptions for different types of ratings on their website, such as, a report 
setting out a methodology for determining their bank ratings. Besides the actual report, 
Moody’s provides tutorials and videos as guidance through the methodology. 
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The methodology report by Moody’s is A detailed report of more than a hundred pages 
for determining bank ratings (see Moody’s 2016). According to them, their methodology 
incorporates and builds upon their own research, their experience of the recent financial 
crisis and academic literature. The overall approach to rating bank instruments comprises 
the following steps: 
 analyzing a bank’s financial and operating environment (macro profile as well 
as financial and qualitative factors) to capture its standalone probability of fail-
ure in the absence of external support 
 capturing the likelihood of affiliate support, such as, a parent, group or co-oper-
ative structure 
 capturing the risks different creditors are exposed to in the event of the bank’s 
failure 
 capturing the extent to which risk to each creditor class is mitigated by public 
support. 
After these steps the final credit rating for each rated instrument is given as well as the 
counterparty risk assessment. A counterparty risk assessment is an assessment of an is-
suer’s ability to avoid defaulting on its operating, such as, non-debt or non-deposit obli-
gations. 
Figure 1 illustrates the rating process for ratings in the case of S&P. The process begins 
when the issuer requests a rating and signs an engagement letter. After the issuer has 
delivered necessary documentation, a team of analysts will review pertinent information. 
In the third phase analysts meet the management of the issuing company to review and 
discuss information. Some of this information may be confidential and it will not be pub-
lished along with the rating outcome. The next step is the actual analysis where analysts 
evaluate information before proposing the rating to a rating committee. At the core of the 
rating process is the rating committee that reviews the lead analyst’s rating recommenda-
tion and then votes on the credit rating. The pre-publication rationale for the rating will 
then be disclosed to the issuer. At this point the issuer will have a chance to appeal that 
leads to a new meeting with the management. If the issuer is satisfied with a rating, the 
rating will be published and disseminated. Once the rating is published, the agency will 
manage surveillance on the issuer to keep the rating current. (S&P 2016). 
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Figure 1 Rating process (S&P, 2015) 
The figure of the rating process is not found on the website of Standard & Poor’s an-
ymore as such. The appealing part has been removed. This is an interesting finding and 
may implicate that agencies are trying to restrain so-called “rate shopping” which indi-
cates that issuers are trying to buy the most favorable rating on the market they can get. 
Some rating agencies produce unsolicited ratings – ratings that are not requested by 
the issuer. These ratings are usually based only on publicly available information and the 
issuer does not pay for these rating assessments. Unsolicited ratings are not as common 
as solicited ratings. As they just rely on publicly available information, their information 
content is questioned. Because issuers are encouraged to get as accurate a rating as pos-
sible, they are usually willing to pay for the rating. (Dittrich 2007, 111–113) 
2.1.5 Criticism of rating agencies 
The use of rating systems has received plenty of criticism in the past decades due to crit-
ical errors in ratings and poor operating practices. The criticism has increased especially 
after the 2007–2008 financial crisis, due to agencies inadequate performance, mostly re-
lated to structured debt products and to “serial downgrading” of securities during the cri-
sis. During the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010–2012 European Union officials 
blamed rating downgrades for accelerating the crisis (CFR 2015). As a result, credit rat-
ings have been placed under intense scrutiny and the regulation of the industry has in-
creased. The dependence of the whole financial system on subjective credit ratings and 
24 
their oligopolistic industry has been questioned. For example, one aim of Basel III is to 
reduce the reliance on external credit ratings in banking regulation (BCBS 2010). 
Since credit rating agencies shifted from an “investor pays” to an “issuer pays” model 
in the 1970s, rating agencies have been criticized for their serious conflicts of interest for 
various reasons. When ratings are paid by the issuer, it creates an incentive for rating 
agencies to please their clients by distorting ratings to win further business or higher fees 
from them. Another problem is called rate shopping. Issuers are able to ask rating agen-
cies how a certain financial instrument would be rated, or even how an instrument should 
be modified to obtain a certain rating. This kind of behavior leads to the situation where 
issuers choose the rating agency that gives the most favorable rating. Thirdly, credit rat-
ings are largely immune to civil and criminal liability for malfeasance as they are consid-
ered as “journalists” by several United States court decisions. (Partnoy 2006) 
Credit ratings had a significant role in the recent subprime mortgage crisis. The new 
complex securities used to finance subprime mortgages were rated by Big Three agencies. 
According to Pagano and Volpino (2010), a massive mispricing of risk of structured debt 
played a key role in the crisis. They state that the mispricing of risk is a result mainly 
from the aforementioned issues of conflicts of interest, such as rate shopping, creating 
rating inflation. Another major reason causing the crisis was that in the process of secu-
ritization, characteristics of the underlying assets were lost. Thus, investors did not un-
derstand the true nature of structured debt products. Pagano and Volpino argue that the 
reason why uninformative ratings were produced, was simply the aim to expand the pri-
mary market of those securities. 
After the massive rating downgrades of structured products, rating accuracy, stability 
and forward-looking characteristics of ratings have been questioned. Big Three agencies 
also downgraded similar securities simultaneously which raises the question of the inde-
pendence of ratings. (Baklanova 2009, 6–7). However, not all criticism comes from the 
failure of only structured products. For instance, famous past examples of rating failures, 
for being too slow to downgrade following credit quality deterioration, include companies 
such as Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat. S&P and Moody’s gave Enron a fine rating until 
four days before its collapse, WorldCom until three months before, and Parmalat until 45 
days before (Langohr & Langohr 2010, 189). 
Ratings are supposed to evaluate default risk over the economic cycle. Thus the recent 
period of massive downgrades of securities may not be fully justifiable (Hau et al. 2013, 
291–292). Rating agencies tend to be quite careful when giving ratings so they prefer to 
downgrade gradually, one notch at a time, instead of decreasing a corporate’s rating many 
notches at once. Thus, during a period of recession, this phenomenon turns out in the form 
of serial downgrading. 
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Other much criticized areas include, for example, the subjective nature of ratings, the 
oligopolistic industry, regulation and supervisory practices, and recently the aggressive-
ness in rating Eurozone countries’ creditworthiness. According to Hau et al. (2013, 296), 
high reliance on rating agencies increases the exposure of the financial system to the ac-
curacy of credit ratings. Mistakes and biased forecasts that agencies make, have the po-
tential to cause or exacerbate crises. 
2.2 Features of the banking industry and the role of credit ratings 
2.2.1 Overview of the industry 
Bank stocks are among the hardest to analyze if compared with other industries. There 
are plenty of reasons to support this statement. Many banks hold billions of euros in cur-
rent assets and have subsidiaries in other industries. The era of the Internet and a global 
trend of deregulation have opened up many new businesses to the banks, besides the fun-
damental role as a financial intermediary. The entire industry is extremely complex and 
requires high expertise to understand all the ins and outs of how banks function. (In-
vestopedia 2014). Thus, information asymmetries between market participants are signif-
icant. The central role of the industry leads to high regulation by the society enabling 
regulatory interventions. Unlike in most other regulated industries, in the banking sector 
the main regulator, the central bank, is also a market participant. 
 All in all, banks are inherently opaque and exposed to a large scale of risks. The unique 
characteristics of the industry pose a particular challenge for external rating agencies. 
According to Morgan (2002), the uncertainty over the bank ratings stems from certain 
assets, loans and trading assets in particular – the risks of which are hard to observe or 
easy to change. In his study Morgan also finds that rating agencies disagree more often 
on ratings concerning banks and insurance companies compared with other industries. He 
concludes that uncertainty over banks seems inevitable and inherent to the business to 
some extent. Thus, it seems that the quality of a bank credit rating may be lower compared 
with other companies. 
The central role of financial institutions also seems to affect credit ratings. This is es-
pecially true in the case of large banks that could be defined as systemically important 
financial institutions. This definition simply implies the importance of a particular bank 
to the financial system – an institution whose failure would be disastrous to the greater 
economic system. As governments try to avoid these failures, there has been lots of dis-
cussion about the so-called “too big to fail” (TBTF) subsidy on large banks. This subsidy 
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may be seen, for example, in banks’ borrowing costs, abnormal stock returns or risk-
taking behavior. (Fieberg et al. 2015) 
The TBTF assumption asserts that certain companies are so big and so interconnected 
that their failure might trigger a financial crisis. Thus, these companies are likely to be 
supported by the government more than the less systemically significant companies in the 
case of failure. In general, these companies are large financial institutions. The TBTF 
subsidy refers to the fact that investors view investments with these banks as a safer in-
vestment than deposits with smaller banks. There is evidence that credit rating agencies 
would assign more favorable ratings to larger banks than those of small banks (e.g. Hau 
et al. 2013). Besides, stock prices of large banks seem to be affected less by rating changes 
than those of small banks (e.g. Fieberg et al. 2015). 
Just as for any other company, a credit rating acquired by a bank is significant for the 
bank’s operations. Bank ratings are an especially relevant determinant of the issuance 
cost of senior unsecured debt. This debt type remains the largest source of long-term 
funding for banks. Thus, credit ratings of senior unsecured debt remain an important as-
sessment of bank creditworthiness. (Hau 2013, 295). One interesting feature concerning 
bank credit ratings is that due to the global bank capital requirements, a bank’s credit 
rating is often dependent on the credit ratings of some of its own assets. This is due to the 
fact that external credit ratings of a bank’s assets may be used in calculation of bank’s 
regulatory capital. 
2.2.2 Rating-based regulation in banking 
According to Liapis (2011), the banking industry is a highly regulated business for the 
following reasons: 
 The monetary nature of bank liabilities. 
 The role of banks as payment intermediaries and providers of credit in an econ-
omy. 
 The information deficiencies that characterize the business of banking, including 
those related to historical cost accounting, bank secrecy and confidentiality. 
One of the most relevant parties concerning global bank capital requirements is the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). It was established by the central bank 
governors of the G-10 countries in 1974. According to BCBS it provides a forum for 
regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters and its aim is to enhance understand-
ing of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide. 
In 1988 BCBS published an international regulatory framework for banks focusing pri-
marily on credit risk and risk-weighting of assets. This was called the 1988 Basel Accord, 
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also known as Basel I, and it was enforced by law in the G-10 countries in 1992. (BIS 
2015)  
The update with the intent to supersede the Basel I accords was initially published in 
2004 and was implemented in most major economies by 2008. Basel II includes a more 
comprehensive set of rules (see BCBS 2006) and also takes into account the operational 
risk and market risk while Basel I focused almost entirely on credit risk. The Basel II 
framework sets out a range of methods that banks could use in order to measure risk to 
calculate regulatory capital. These include the standardized approach and the internal 
rating-based (IRB) approach. The standardized approach allows banks to measure credit 
risk in a standardized manner based on external credit ratings. In this approach external 
credit ratings are used to compute risk weights for bank assets. For instance, a security 
with a better credit rating would apply for a smaller risk weight in calculation of bank’s 
regulatory capital. In many countries the standardized manner is the only approach used 
to approve Basel II Accord.  
The alternative way to calculate regulatory capital, the IRB approach, is based on a 
bank’s use of its own internal models. To be able to use the IRP approach, banks need to 
meet certain minimum conditions, disclosure requirements and approval from their na-
tional supervisors. In practice, only large banks are usually able to meet these require-
ments and also capable to develop their own advanced internal risk control systems. Over-
all, it can be said that Basel II increased regulatory reliance on credit ratings. There even 
exists anecdotal evidence that the internal models themselves often tend to rely heavily 
on credit ratings for actual or methodological input (Hau et al. 2013, 296). 
After the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, it was widely considered that the defi-
ciencies in financial regulation had led to the crisis, and thus, the third installment of the 
Basel Accords was proposed in 2010. The implementation of Basel III is supposed to take 
place by the end of 2010s. Basel III focuses primarily on the risk of a bank run and does 
not supersede the Basel I and Basel II guidelines for the most part and will rather work 
alongside them. (BIS 2015) 
During the writing of this thesis, the development of Basel III is still going on. The 
BCBS seeks to significantly improve the standardized approach for credit risk in a variety 
of ways. These include, for example, reducing the reliance on external credit ratings and 
strengthening the link between the standardized approach and IRB approach (BCBS 
2010). However, Stefan Ingves, the chairman of BCBS, told in his speech at the IIF An-
nual Membership Meeting in October 2015 that he expects supervisors to follow the path 
of simplification rather than increasing complexity and that this approach is likely to in-
clude a reintroduction of role for external credit ratings (BIS Speeches). Anyway, the 
development of Basel III has been rather slow and the proposals introduced by BCBS 
(see e.g. BCBS 2015) have received substantial negative feedback, delaying the process 
further. 
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2.2.3 Characteristics of the European banking sector 
The European financial system is dominated by the banking sector in most European 
countries. The capital market represents the second main component of the system. (Sargu 
2012, 70). If compared with the United States, banks are more important for the credit 
mechanism in the economy on the European level. In the United States the capital market 
dominates and it is easier to get funding outside of the commercial banking system. (Can-
cian 2016). 
The current European landscape has been plagued by financial, economic and national 
debt crisis. The banking system of the European Union represents one of the most affected 
economic sectors by the global financial and economic crisis. A vivid debate at the policy 
maker level has been required for the huge budgetary effort to ensure the stability of the 
system to avoid bank failures. Bank failures have been avoided through public capitali-
zations and nationalization or mergers and acquisitions. (Sargu 2012, 68) 
Figure 2 demonstrates the development of STOXX Europe 600 Banks Price Index 
between 2000 and 2015. The STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index contains of 47 banks from 
16 European countries and is one of the most comprehensive European banking indices.  
 
Figure 2 STOXX Europe 600 Banks Price Index (2000–2015) 
The figure shows clearly how significantly the banks were affected by the financial crisis 
after a rapid growth period of nearly five years from 2002 till 2007. During the crisis the 
index dropped from over 500 index points to 100 points in less than two years. Also the 
volatile environment of the European sovereign and banking crisis starting just after the 
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Taking into account the number of countries in Europe, it is rather challenging to make 
strong generalizations of the characteristics of the banking sector. If considering only the 
member states of the European Union (28 states in 2016), those could be distinguished 
between two relatively homogeneous groups based on the main characteristics of the 
banking system. These are the EU-15 member countries and the new EU member states. 
The EU-15 countries have benefited from a long period of capitalism and free market and 
achieved a more sophisticated and developed financial system. The newer EU member 
states went through a process of transition to market economy prior to the European inte-
gration process and their financial system is thus less developed. (Sargu 2012) 
There have been few studies examining whether the location of banks affects credit 
ratings. One recent study by van Loon and de Haan (2015), however, examines whether 
credit ratings of banks are related to their location inside and outside the euro area. They 
find evidence that banks located in euro area member countries receive a higher credit 
rating from Fitch than banks located outside the euro area in average. Their results also 
suggest that large banks in the euro area receive higher credit ratings if compared with 
their smaller competitors. Thus, evidence for the TBTF effect was found – large banks 
seem to have a competitive advantage over small banks. 
2.3 Review of literature of credit rating announcements 
2.3.1 Introduction to the research field 
Poon and Chan (2008) divide the research of credit ratings into two strands. The first 
strand of literature that this thesis also belongs to, investigates whether initial ratings and 
rating changes instantaneously affect stock and bond prices. The direction of an effect as 
well as possible anticipation and delay are on the focus. The event study methodology is 
a common tool in this research area and it is often combined with single regression equa-
tion models. If credit ratings are useful, market participants should react to the new infor-
mation in rating announcements. The second strand examines the determinants of credit 
ratings. This study field focuses on the predictability of credit rating changes based on 
the accounting information of the firms and capital market conditions. Deterministic mod-
els such as discriminant and cluster analysis are often used. 
The aim of this study is to examine the effect of rating announcements on daily stock 
returns. Thus, the question of whether stock prices integrate all pertinent information to 
pricing is critical. In efficient markets, first introduced by Fama (1970), stock prices 
should reflect all information. There are three common versions of efficient-market hy-
pothesis that implicate how markets work: weak, semi-strong and strong forms. If capital 
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markets are weak-form efficient, future prices cannot be depending and determined on 
historical prices. A semi-strong form of market efficiency symbolizes that all publicly 
available information is mirrored in the prices. In strong-form efficiency all available 
information, both public and non-public, is reflected in security prices. 
In the case of credit ratings, when a rating of a firm is announced, its effect should 
come in the firm’s stock price. As the purpose of credit ratings is to measure credit risk, 
there are two alternative views on how rating agencies manage to produce this kind of 
information content (Gropp & Richards 2001, 7). One view is that rating agencies only 
have access to publicly available information and that there is a lag in processing it. If 
this is the case, ratings should not have an effect on market prices as prices already include 
all publicly available information (semi-strong market efficiency). 
The other view, however, states that rating agencies are able to obtain private infor-
mation in their rating process and thus produce new information affecting market prices. 
After all, rating agencies have discussions with the management of their target companies 
in their rating processes. Besides, many empirical studies provide evidence in favour of 
the second theory as significant price effects are observed on stock and bond markets 
especially after rating downgrades. In the light of these facts, the second view looks some-
what more potential. There are naturally many reasons which may affect stock and bond 
prices besides rating announcements. These could include determinants, such as, firm 
size, industry, market area, capital structure and the recent credit class, to mention some. 
There has been a voluminous body of literature studying the effect of rating changes 
on stock and debt markets since the 1970s that this thesis is related to. Studies are usually 
conducted using data from S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. The research has previously focused 
on corporate stocks and bonds. However, recently a substantial amount of research has 
also been done on credit default swaps and sovereign debt markets. Even though the in-
formation content of credit ratings is a widely investigated topic, prior literature proves a 
lack of consensus due to varied and mixed findings. This is not a surprise as the research 
field includes numerous studies with different data sets from different markets. Also, the 
used methodological design varies a lot among the studies. A challenging example of a 
methodological problem is called data contamination. A rating change is contaminated, 
if there are earnings announcements or other relevant news around the announcement, 
such as, other rating announcements. These confounding events are unwanted events that 
occur during the window of observation and have an impact on a company’s stock price 
disturbing the true influence of a rating announcement. 
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2.3.2 Debt market reaction 
There are several studies that examine the impact of credit ratings on bond prices. A con-
siderable amount of first studies concerning rating change announcements were done on 
corporate bonds. For example, Hand et al. (1992) found evidence that daily bond returns 
are sensitive to bond rating changes. According to them, bond prices respond negatively 
to downgrades and positively to upgrades in the case of rating changes and credit watches. 
Thus, rating agencies seem to produce new information for the market. For instance, 
Wansley, Glascock and Clauretie (1992) confirm the significant negative effect of down-
grades on bond returns using weekly data. However, in the case of upgrades this effect 
was not found. 
There haven’t been many studies related to corporate bonds recently. A number of first 
credit rating studies were conducted studying the effect on bond prices. Afterwards the 
research has been more focused on stock market response. For the last decade, there have 
been plenty of studies concerning credit default swaps (CDS). A CDS is a credit deriva-
tive contract between two parties where the buyer makes periodic payments to the seller 
in exchange for a commitment to a payoff if a third party defaults (Hull, Predescu & 
White 2004, 2790). 
One of the first researches to study the relationship between CDS spreads and credit 
rating announcements were Hull et al. (2004). According to them, CDS spreads are an 
interesting alternative to bond prices in empirical research for a couple of reasons. They 
mention, for example, that CDS spreads are already credit spreads, so no adjustment is 
required. Bond yields, for their part, require an assumption about the appropriate bench-
mark risk-free rate before they can be converted into credit spreads. Overall, Hull et al. 
found that rating announcements for positive rating events are much less significant than 
the results for negative rating ones. Also, for example, Galil and Soffer (2011) report that 
the market reaction to downgrades is stronger than the reaction to upgrades. Study results 
of Daniels and Jensen (2004) reveal that the CDS market reacts faster and more signifi-
cantly to changes in credit ratings if compared with the bond market. 
Besides corporate bond and CDS research, there are studies examining the effect of 
sovereign credit rating announcements on sovereign bond yields spreads. Previous work 
in literature has focused on emerging and developing economies as debt crises have been 
more common in those environments. Nevertheless, after the 2007–2008 financial crisis, 
the research related to developed economies has rapidly increased. Likewise, in these 
studies rating downgrades are often more significant, while the reaction of spreads to 
positive rating events is more mitigated (see e.g. Afonso, Furceri & Gomes 2012). 
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2.3.3 Stock market reaction 
A substantial amount of research has been completed to investigate the stock market re-
action of credit rating announcements. As the data and methodological design used in 
these studies varies a lot, the results are often mixed and contradictory. This makes gen-
eralizing the results rather challenging although there seem to exist at least some trends 
in average.  
The majority of the papers are conducted by using event studies that are often com-
bined with single regression equation models. Event studies usually focus on the direction 
of stock price reaction and possible anticipation and delay. Besides rating announce-
ments, some studies also take into consideration other information disclosures produced 
by agencies, such as, rating watches and outlooks. Regressions are used to investigate 
what characteristics of rating changes explain abnormal returns. 
Most previous studies, especially the first ones, focused on the United States market 
(e.g. Weinstein 1977; Wakeman 1978; Pinches & Singleton 1978; Holthausen & Left-
wich 1986). The early studies were often conducted using monthly data (e.g. Pinches & 
Singleton 1978). Since the adoption of daily data in 1980s, the amount of this research 
type increased (Corrado 2011, 213). According to Brown and Warner (1985), daily data 
generally presents few difficulties for event studies but can sometimes be advantageous. 
Since the 1990s, studies using European data increased (e.g. Barron, Clare & Thomas 
1997; Linciano 2004; Li, Visaltanachoti & Kesayan 2004), and a bit later papers emerged 
focusing on other stock markets around the world (e.g. Matolcsy & Lianto 1995; Richards 
& Deddouche 1999; Elayan et al. 2003; Li, Shin & William 2006; Poon & Chan 2008; 
Habib, Nazir, Hashmi & Saeed 2015). 
The trend in prior research seems to be that stock prices tend to react asymmetrically 
to announcements of upgrades and downgrades of a company’s credit rating. Rating 
downgrades are typically associated with significantly negative abnormal returns while 
the reaction among rating upgrades is often more limited or insignificant. Studies, such 
as, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand et al. (1992), Schweitzer, Szewczyk and 
Varma 1992, Goh and Ederington (1993), Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) and Fieberg et al. 
(2015) support this statement. However, few studies also find evidence of positive abnor-
mal returns in the case of upgrades. It can be noticed that many of these studies use non-
Unites States market data, such as, data from New Zealand (Elayan et al. 2003), Sweden 
(Li et al. 2004), Japan (Li et al. 2006) and data from emerging markets (Han, Shin, Rein-
hart & Moore 2009). There are also some particularly contradictory studies. For example, 
Richards and Deddouche (1999) studied emerging market banks and found significant 
negative market reaction in the case of rating upgrades. Abad-Romero and Roble-Fernan-
dez (2006) got similar results from the Spanish stock market. 
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According to one view, the reasoning behind the trend of significant negative down-
grades and insignificant upgrades comes from the idea that the expertise of rating agen-
cies and their access to private information allows them to sometimes uncover infor-
mation about target companies. As companies usually have a strong incentive to publish 
positive information about their prospects, market prices already reflect this favourable 
information in most cases. Thus in the case of rating upgrades, little or no impact in the 
stock prices is observed. Whereas in the case of downgrades, the impact is more signifi-
cant as companies generally have no such incentive to publish unfavourable information 
that quickly. (Richards & Deddouche 1999, 5) 
The evidence also suggests that the abnormal returns around announcements are small 
for downgrades and even smaller for upgrades, if even significant. The magnitude of the 
returns witnessed over the previous year or so is much greater. Hence, most of the infor-
mation contained in rating changes is already reflected in stock prices prior to the actual 
change. For instance, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) discovered cumulative abnormal 
returns in the 300 trading days before ratings changes to be 12-15 percent for upgrades 
and around -20 percent for downgrades. By contrast, during the announcement period the 
abnormal return for the downgrades stocks was just 1 percent. (Richards & Deddouche 
1999, 5). 
However, there seem to be many factors in which the strength and the direction of the 
effects observed are dependent on. These include, for instance, the rated firm’s former 
credit rating (e.g. Goh & Ederington 1999; Jorion & Zhang 2010), whether a rating 
agency is certified or not (Beaver, Shakespeare & Soliman 2006), whether a rating is 
solicited or not (Behr & Güttler 2008) and whether investors have free access to rating 
reports or not (Chan, Edwards & Walter 2009). There have also been comparison studies 
including firm specific factors, such as, the industry (Linciano 2004) and the size of the 
firm (Fieberg et al. 2015) as a data separator. Some papers focus on the impacts of crises 
– especially the recent financial crisis has received much attention. These studies inves-
tigate the effect of rating announcements, either during the crisis (e.g. Ghachem 2015), 
or using the crisis as a cut-off point to divide the data (e.g. Fieberg et al. 2015). It is also 
good to keep in mind that there are studies finding evidence that rating announcements 
do not have any impact at all. Especially the first papers (e.g. Weinstein 1977; Wakeman 
1978) found no significant effect regarding rating announcements about stock returns. 
However, this may result from the use of weekly or monthly data (Habib et al. 2015). 
There are also papers studying whether stock prices react differently to rating changes 
depending on the underlying reason. Goh and Ederington (1993) point out that while re-
cent studies have found in average that the market reaction to downgrades is significantly 
negative, this should not be expected of all downgrades. They give two reasons for this. 
Firstly, some rating changes are anticipated by market participants as many of them fol-
low news of an increase in the firm’s riskiness. Secondly, and more importantly, a rating 
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downgrade is naturally bad news for bondholders but not necessarily for stockholders. If 
a downgrade results from an increase in leverage which will transfer wealth from bond-
holders to stockholders, this should have a positive effect on stock prices but a negative 
effect on bonds. In other words, if a downgrade is motivated by an increase in risk, rather 
than a deterioration of earnings, it could be associated with positive returns. The same 
theory could explain why upgrades do not have a significant stock price effect. If some 
upgrades are due to anticipated increases in earnings and others to anticipated declines in 
leverage, the average reaction may not be significant. 
In their study Goh and Ederington (1993) received some modest support for their the-
ory. They divided their uncontaminated sample into categories based on the reason of the 
rating change. The results show that the downgrades associated with deteriorating finan-
cial prospects convey new negative information to the capital market, but that the down-
grades due to changes in firms' leverage do not. Their conclusion is that rating changes 
cannot be treated as homogeneously as the underlining reason matters. For instance, 
Gropp and Richards (2001) support this theory in their study of European banks. 
2.3.4 Bank-related research 
There appears not to exist that many event study-based papers concerning credit rating 
announcements which focus solely on the banking sector. There is no consensus on 
whether the banking sector gives any different results from other industries in this re-
search area. Schweitzer et al. (1992) give two alternative hypothesis on whether rating 
actions affect differently for banks and for other corporates. The first hypothesis suggests 
that as banks are highly regulated entities, there may be more information available on 
the market compared with other corporates. Thus, the information content of rating an-
nouncements might be lower. According to the other view, rating actions matter more for 
banks. This is based on the idea that regulators might allow withholding of adverse infor-
mation to preserve the stability of the banking system. For example, financially distressed 
banks would otherwise lose their access to the capital markets disrupting the financial 
stability. However, Schweitzer et al. did not find evidence in their study that the United 
States bank holding companies would be dampened relative to those for unregulated in-
dustrial firms. 
There are also a few studies that have found evidence of a difference between financial 
and industrial firms. For example, in his study Linciano (2004) reports some modest em-
pirical evidence from the Italian market that downgrades lead to stronger effect when 
involving industrial firms compared with banks. Abad-Romero and Roble-Fernandez 
(2006) on the other hand noticed that the main effects of downgrades do not depend on 
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the company’s industry, whereas in the case of upgrades there seems to be some differ-
ences. Yet, this topic clearly needs more investigation. 
There are at least two United States studies showing that rating changes for bank debt 
affect their stock prices. The first one of these conducted by Schweitzer et al. (1992) 
focused on 32 different bank holding companies containing 95 rating changes obtained 
from S&P between 1977 and 1987. However, only 18 of the announcements were up-
grades. The estimation period of [-200, -60] was used to estimate market model parame-
ters. They also examined any firm-specific events for the [-1, 1] estimation window re-
ported in the Wall Street Journal Index. An observation was classified as being contami-
nated if any events occurred. Besides, they segregated announcements by whether a 
change of a rating grade was across or within classes (see Table 2). 
In overall, Schweitzer et al. (1992) report that downgrade announcements are associ-
ated with negative and statistically significant abnormal returns. This holds for grade 
changes within and across classes and for contaminated and uncontaminated ratings. An 
average abnormal return during the announcement window for downgrades was -1.5 per-
cent and the previous 60 trading days represented abnormal returns of nearly -7 percent. 
Little evidence was found between contaminated and uncontaminated samples or whether 
the rating changes were across or within classes. The samples of 18 upgrades were asso-
ciated with positive but only marginally significant abnormal returns of 1.1 percent for 
the announcement window. However, there was no significant stock price performance 
within the pre-announcement and post-announcement windows. Besides, Schweitzer et 
al. (1992) conducted a cross-sectional regression analysis of downgrades. The variables 
included the number of grades by which a rating is downgraded and whether a preceded 
credit watch or a rival rating from another agency matters. Only the variable concerning 
number of grades was significant but just barely. 
The second United States study by Billett, Garfinkel and O’Neal (1998) examined the 
relationship between changes in bank credit risk and the use of insured deposit. Their 
initial samples gathered from Moody’s consisted of rating announcements of 59 bank 
holding companies between 1990 and 1995. As a part of their study they confirm the 
negative announcement effect of downgrades. They reported a cumulative average ab-
normal return of -1.1 percent for the 3-day [-2, 0] event window. No data is provided on 
the pre-announcement abnormal returns. They argue that the share of insured deposits in 
total liabilities is the most significant variable in explaining abnormal returns. Thus, banks 
can shield themselves from the full costs of market discipline through increases in insured 
deposits. 
Probably the first ones to study emerging markets were Richards and Deddouche 
(1999). They focused on banks in 15 countries, mostly located in Asia and South Amer-
ica, and their sample included 49 banks with 219 rating changes. They expected the data 
for emerging markets to yield larger abnormal returns following rating announcements 
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compared with mature markets. That is, one would expect there to be less information 
provided to the public about banks in emerging markets, giving rating agencies an im-
portant role acquiring new information. They also assumed rating changes to have a 
greater effect on banks compared with other industries as banks’ operating profits are 
highly dependent upon the cost of their funding. 
Richards and Deddouche (1999) focused on rating changes that are not immediately 
proceeded by other changes, reducing the sample to 43 downgrades and 15 upgrades. 
They used weekly data between 1989 and 1998. The usefulness of weekly data is argued 
by non-trading biases and possible inefficiencies in emerging markets. Market adjusted 
returns were chosen instead of the market model. They used weeks -35 to -4 as the esti-
mation window and weeks -3 to 2 as the event window. 
The results of the study of Richards and Deddouche (1999) are rather surprising as 
they found negative abnormal returns immediately following upgrades and positive ab-
normal returns following downgrades. The reaction to upgrades was statistically quite 
strong but in the case of downgrades, the positive returns were not statistically significant. 
During the 35 weeks prior to rating upgrades, the cumulative abnormal return of -1 per-
cent was shown. In the case of downgrades, the corresponding return was -13 percent. 
Richards and Deddouche also used a regression analysis to define whether a series of 
explanatory variables might have a possible influence on the magnitude of price reaction 
to rating changes. These variables include, for example, the number of rating grades and 
whether a rating is preceded by a credit watch. However, they did not get economically 
significant or meaningful results for their data set. Thus, they concluded that rating 
changes do not seem to convey valuable information for emerging equity markets in the 
way one would expect. 
Habib et al. (2015) likewise found similar kinds of contradictory results from emerging 
markets. Their study examined the impact of credit rating announcements on stock returns 
of 22 Pakistani banks rated by the Pakistan Credit Rating Agency. Thus, this study is the 
only paper introduced in this subsection that does not include ratings from any Big Three 
companies. Habib et al. used daily stock returns from 2008 to 2014. Their results suggest 
that all banks individually generate insignificant average abnormal returns, thus rating 
announcements do not have an impact on stock returns. The study reveals a positive sig-
nificant cumulative average abnormal return for rating downgrades but an insignificant 
cumulative average abnormal return for upgrades. The market also significantly reacts 
before rating downgrades so rating changes seem to be anticipated. As there are also sig-
nificant results occurring after rating downgrades, it seems that the market is not efficient 
in managing and handling the rating downgrade information. 
Probably the most relevant, although not very recent study, is the paper from Gropp 
and Richards (2001). They focused on rating changes for European banks using a sample 
of 32 banks with 163 rating changes during 1989 to 2000. The sample included banks 
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from 15 European Union members. The sample size was rather small due the fact that 
there had not been that many rating changes, but also because the authors solely chose 
banks that had a major subordinated debt instrument outstanding as they used ratings of 
this debt type. In their study, Gropp and Richards analyzed rating watches together with 
rating changes. 
Gropp and Richards (2001) used the estimation window of [-100, -6] and the event 
window of [-1, 1]. A standard market model was used for estimation window in which 
they used the respective stock market index of the country as the market indicator. To 
follow the previous literature to identify contaminated rating changes (e.g. Schweitzer et 
al. 1992), they scanned news stories in Bloomberg for the [-1, 1] window regarding the 
bank. If a text which revealed the reasoning for the rating change was found, they con-
sidered the event as contaminated. Furthermore, they also attempted to identify the rea-
sons behind rating changes to follow Goh and Ederington’s (1993) intuition that the rea-
son may matter. 
Besides, Gropp and Richards (1999) controlled for expected versus unexpected rating 
changes. To do this, they identified whether a rating change occurred after a rating watch 
in the same direction. For example, if a downgrade occurred after a negative watch signal, 
they pronounced the rating change as expected. One could anticipate expected rating 
changes to not necessarily be associated with a market reaction. 
Overall, Gropp and Richards (2001) found that rating changes have statistically sig-
nificant and economically substantial effects. The upgrades were associated with a posi-
tive abnormal return of 1.2 percent on the event day and 1.5 percent in the event window 
of [-1, 1]. For the downgrades, the abnormal return was -0.5 percent on the event day but 
insignificant in the [-1, 1] event window. Thus, Gropp and Richards did not find that 
prices react more strongly to downgrades. This is in contrast to some of the previous 
literature (e.g. Schweitzer et al. 1992). 
However, Gropp and Richards (2001) noticed that in the case of uncontaminated 
downgrades, average abnormal returns still remained significant whereas in the case of 
uncontaminated upgrades, they did not. Thus, there appears to be information contained 
in the rating changes per se in the case of downgrades, when news stories and the release 
of information about the bank is somewhat excluded. Gropp and were also able to support 
Goh and Ederington’s theory that the reason for the rating change may matter. If a down-
grade is motivated by an increase in risk, rather than a deterioration of earnings, it is more 
likely associated with positive returns. 
Gropp and Richards (2001) received evidence that unexpected ratings react more 
strongly to stock prices than expected ones. This is in accordance with their expectations. 
Besides, Gropp and Richard tested for pre-announcement and post-announcement effects 
but found little evidence of substantial drifts. The absence of pre-announcement drifts 
may provide that there is news in the rating announcements that was not yet in the public 
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domain. Overall, the results of the study suggest that rating agencies may have a useful 
role in summarizing and obtaining non-public information on banks for stockholders. 
However, they noted that they faced very small data samples in their study which were 
likely to affect the test results. 
One of the most relevant and recent studies examining stock price effects of bank credit 
rating changes was conducted by Fieberg et al. (2015). They studied the information con-
tent of about 3300 global bank rating changes in 154 countries between 2000 and 2012, 
making it probably the most comprehensive bank-related event study so far. Besides up-
grades and downgrades, they also divided the sample into small and large banks to exam-
ine whether large banks benefit from the TBTF subsidy. This is interesting as large finan-
cial institutions often stand out in terms of their systemic relevance, complexity and opac-
ity, compared with non-financial firms and small banks. Furthermore, Fieberg et al. stud-
ied the impact of rating changes before and after the Lehman bankruptcy in September 
2008 to assess if differences in stock market reactions for small and big banks emerge. 
For example, Salvador et al. (2014) state that rating agencies have significantly tightened 
their bank rating policies since the financial crisis which may be seen in the results. 
Fieberg et al. (2015) used the estimation period from 250 to 46 days prior to the event 
to estimate the parameters required by the Fama-French three-factor model which they 
used as a benchmark model to estimate expected returns. Their findings confirm the 
asymmetry in upgrades and downgrades proved by many prior studies. In their study, 
rating upgrades were not associated with significant abnormal returns, but downgrades 
had a significantly negative effect. This was the case for both small and large banks, alt-
hough negative abnormal returns were substantially stronger for small banks. This is in 
line with the recent TBTF debate that potential negative effects on large banks’ returns 
are dampened by an implicit TBTF bonus. Though, the main impact of rating downgrades 
for large banks was captured by negative abnormal returns well before the event and it 
was not significant for the [-1, 1] event window. On the contrary, banks in the small port-
folio experienced cumulative average abnormal return of -11.3 percent for the [-1, 1] 
event window. 
In addition, Fieberg et al. (2015) found that negative abnormal returns were signifi-
cantly larger for small banks after Lehman, but almost all of the increase in negative 
abnormal returns occurred before the event. The similar pattern was seen in the case of 
large banks, but the negative effect was economically weaker. When observing the [-1, 
1] event window, negative abnormal returns were significant and about the same size pre- 
and post-Lehman for small banks. For large banks, abnormal returns were not signifi-
cantly different from zero in either periods. According to them, this may indicate that an 
implicit TBTF subsidy remains even after the financial crisis. 
Table 3 summarizes the bank-related stock price studies introduced in this subsection. 
It includes both the technical brief and the study results in a compressed form: 
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Table 3 Summary of studies concerning bank stock prices 
Technical aspect Study results 
Schweitzer et al. (1992) 
 USA 
 32 banks, 95 rating changes 
 S&P 
 daily data 1977–1987 
 market model 
 debt ratings 
 upgrades: marginally significant positive  
returns 
 downgrades: significant negative returns 
 
The results hold even when confounding 
events are removed from the sample. 
Billet et al. (1998) 
 USA 
 59 banks, 233 rating changes 
 Moody’s 
 daily data 1990–1995 
 market model 
 debt ratings 
 downgrades: significant negative returns 
 
The share of insured deposits in total liabilities 
is the most important variable in explaining 
abnormal returns. 
Richards and Deddouche (1999) 
 15 emerging countries 
 49 banks, 219 rating changes 
 Big Three 
 weekly data 1989–1998 
 market adjusted returns 
 long-term debt/financial strength 
 upgrades: significant negative returns 
 downgrades: insignificant 
 
Bank stock prices do not respond to rating 
changes in the way that one would expect. 
Gropp and Richards (2001) 
 15 European countries 
 32 banks, 163 rating changes 
 Big Three 
 daily data 1989–2000 
 market model 
 subordinated bonds 
 upgrades: significant positive returns 
 downgrades: significant negative returns 
(overall) 
 
Stock prices react differently to rating down-
grades depending on the reason – positive re-
action if motivated by an increase in risk. 
Fieberg et al. (2015) 
 154 countries 
 3300 rating changes 
 Big Three 
 daily data 2000–2012 
 Fama-French three-factor model 
 long-term issuer ratings 
 upgrades: insignificant 
 downgrades: significant negative returns 
 
Downgrades affect small banks more nega-
tively than large ones. 
Habib et al. (2015) 
 Pakistan 
 22 banks, 154 rating changes 
 Pakistan Credit Rating Agency 
 daily data 2008-2014 
 CAPM 
 long-term issuer rating 
upgrades: insignificant 
downgrades: positive significant results 
 
Bank stock prices do not respond to rating 




3.1 Main hypotheses 
The aim of this study is to examine the effect of credit rating changes on daily stock 
returns for a sample of European banks. Based on the efficient-market hypothesis, credit 
rating announcements should not affect stock prices as stock prices already reflect all 
available information (Fama 1970). Even though empirical results show that markets are 
not usually efficient, at least in the strong form, the efficient-market hypothesis is still an 
easy and suitable starting point to help to analyze deviations via market efficiency. There-
fore, it is also used as a basis to form the research hypotheses of this study. According to 
the efficient-market hypothesis, the following hypothesis should hold true: 
 
H1: Credit rating announcements have no significant effect on stock returns. 
 
If H1 holds true, it seems that stock prices already reflect all the information contained 
in the rating announcement. Rating agencies just process this information with a lag. In 
this case, there is no link between the rating announcement and stock prices. All price 
effects are observed early prior the event day. 
However, a vast amount of studies report statistically significant abnormal returns as-
sociated with credit rating announcements. Besides the announcement time, the research 
focuses on the time periods prior and after the event. Whether rating agencies are able to 
obtain new information to the market, the price effect should occur after the announce-
ment. In an efficient market, the reaction to news should be rapid and take place after the 
disclosure, unless information is leaked (Fama 1970). In the case of credit rating agencies, 
it is unlikely that a rating itself would leak to the market beforehand. However, the infor-
mation included in a rating may be available to the public prior to the announcement, in 
which case the market “anticipates” the following rating action. Rating agencies also tend 
to give their own subjective signals about future ratings in the form of rating watches and 
outlooks. 
Regardless, the only way to test whether rating announcements provide new infor-
mation to the market, is to examine the abnormal returns around the event day. If rating 
announcements do provide real-time and pertinent new information (rejection of H1), the 
following hypothesis should hold true with regard to the efficient market hypothesis: 
 
H2: Stock markets do not anticipate credit rating announcements, but react immedi-
ately afterwards. 
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The more anticipation there is, the less pertinent new information there is in the rating 
announcement. In the real world one could expect H2 to hold true partially: some antici-
pation before the event and some reaction in stock prices afterwards, given that one can 
assume H1 to be rejected. For example, Schweitzer et al. (1992) find anticipation of 
downgrades over the previous 60 trading days before the announcement, but they also 
discover significant abnormal returns during the announcement window. Fieberg et al. 
(2015) similarly report anticipation before the announcement and significant abnormal 
returns on the event window. Gropp and Richards (2001) for their part do not find evi-
dence of abnormal returns over longer pre- or post-announcement periods. Thus, they 
conclude that rating announcements include news that was not already in the public do-
main. 
Although there have been papers studying whether stock prices react differently to 
rating changes depending on the underlying reason (e.g. Goh and Ederington 1993), the 
majority of empirical research seems to concur that stock market effects in average are 
asymmetric for rating downgrades and upgrades (e.g. Hand et al. 1992; Matolcsy and 
Lianto 1995: Goh and Ederington 1993). More specifically, the average stock price reac-
tion to rating downgrades is negative, and insignificant or marginal to rating upgrades. 
Anyhow, the majority of these studies focus on the United States markets. There are also 
studies reporting contradictory results especially from non-US markets, such as, from 
Sweden (Li et al. 2004), Japan (Li et al. 2006) and from emerging markets (Han et al. 
2009). As there are not many studies concerning especially banks, it is not possible to 
state that the research trend would also hold with this industry. However, some bank stud-
ies, such as, Schweitzer et al. (1992) and Fieberg et al. (2015) provide evidence for the 
trend by finding negative abnormal returns for downgrades and insignificant or marginal 
returns for upgrades. 
With regard to the study of Goh and Ederington (1993), even if the underlining reason 
triggering the rating event (an increase in risk versus a deterioration of earnings) matters, 
this may be unlikely with respect to banks. In their study Fieberg et al. (2015, 248) note 
that bank capital structure is typically heavily biased towards debt financing. This gives 
them a very limited leeway for changes in leverage which would benefit shareholders. On 
the other hand, Gropp and Richards (2001) do find evidence supporting Goh and Eder-
ington in their study concerning European banks. 
All in all, it is convenient to form the hypothesis concerning upgrades and downgrades 
according to the research trend. Thus the presumption follows the subsequent hypothesis 






H3: Rating announcements are asymmetric for downgrades and downgrades on stock 
prices around the announcement day. 
 
H3a: Rating downgrades have a statistically significant (negative) effect. 
 
H3b: Rating upgrades have no statistically significant (positive) effect. 
 
Besides rating change announcements, agencies also produce rating watches to indi-
cate the likely direction of a rating in the future. For instance, Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1986) and Hand et al. (1992) stress that it is important to also consider information con-
tained in rating watches. They find evidence that significant abnormal returns are associ-
ated with rating watch announcements. Thus, the same hypotheses concerning rating 
changes are also tested with rating watches in this thesis. Typically, rating watches are 
less often studied compared to rating changes. Sometimes they are even used together 
with rating changes if there have not been enough observations (e.g. Gropp & Richards 
2001). To the knowledge of the author, the information content of rating watch announce-
ments is not comprehensively studied regarding banks. It is informing to see whether they 
produce any new information to the market and whether their impact on stock prices is 
similar to rating changes in the case of European banks. 
3.2 Additional tests 
Besides studying only stock price effects of rating announcements, some additional tests 
are conducted to investigate other potential determinants of the abnormal returns sur-
rounding downgrades and upgrades. The determinants to be studied are as follows: 
 market value of the corresponding firm 
 number of notches by which each rating is changed 
 whether a rating is preceded by a credit watch 
 whether a rating was preceded by a rival rating in the near past 
 whether a rating changes between or within classes 
 whether a rating changes within the investment or below investment class 
 whether a rating occurred before or after the beginning of the financial crisis. 
The market value is used to control the firm size effect. According to, for example 
Fieberg et al. (2015), smaller and larger banks are affected differently. Large financial 
institutions often stand out in terms of their systemic relevance, complexity and opacity. 
When controlling firm size effect, large banks may be benefiting from the implicit public 
TBTF guarantee. Thus, their price effect is probably smaller if compared with smaller 
banks. Fieberg et al. had a large sample of 3200 observations which allowed them to 
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compare the largest and the smallest banks, excluding medium sized banks entirely. How-
ever, in this thesis the sample size is much smaller and the procedure in question is not 
possible. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see whether the market value as a control vari-
able still effects abnormal returns when the sample includes banks of all sizes. 
One could expect the price effect to be stronger if a rating is changed many notches at 
once instead of just one. Rating agencies tend to give rating changes gradually, one notch 
at a time, so changing many notches at once is rather exceptional. For instance, Schweit-
zer et al. (1992) and Richards and Deddouche (1999) have studied this topic in their pa-
pers examining banks. Regression analysis were conducted in both studies but little evi-
dence for a stronger price reaction in the case of many notches was found. 
Besides studying whether rating watches contain market relevant information, those 
are also exploited in another way in this study. They are used as a means of distinguishing 
between expected and unexpected rating changes. For instance, Hand et al. (1992) and 
Gropp and Richards (2001) argue and got support in their studies that a rating change that 
is preceded by a ratings watch in the same direction, should not necessarily be associated 
with a reaction in market prices. In other words, unexpected rating changes should cause 
a stronger price reaction if compared to expected ones. 
One could expect the abnormal returns to be stronger if there are no rival rating 
changes close before a rating announcement. If the rating announcement is preceded by 
another rating announcement of a rival agency in the same direction, it may be possible 
that investors react to the first rating more intensively. Thus, the second rating by another 
agency is most likely to be less unpredictable. There have been various ways how this 
variable is coded. For instance, Schweitzer et al. (1992) investigated whether it matters if 
the Wall Street Journal Index for the year of the downgrade reports that a bank’s rating 
change by S&P is preceded by a similar rating change by Moody’s. However, the regres-
sion coefficients for this variable are not statistically significant. 
The next two determinants are related to rating classes that were described in Table 2. 
A rating change occurs between classes, for example, if a rating with a grade of A+ is 
upgraded into AA-. A rating change between classes is naturally expected to have a 
stronger impact compared with changes within classes. However, the threshold between 
investment and non-investment grade ratings is more significant as it is widely used in 
regulation unlike the other sub-categories. To the knowledge of the author, these topics 
are not investigated especially concerning banks. Anyway, there is evidence that an-
nouncements of downgrades across rating classes are associated with more negative ab-
normal returns compared to changes within classes (Holthausen & Leftwich 1986). More-
over, for downgrades, the average returns are demonstrated to be stronger for below in-
vestment grade stocks than for investment grade stocks (Hand et al. 1992). 
Fieberg et al. (2015) studied the information content of rating changes before and after 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers with their global sample of 3200 bank observations. 
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They were interested to see whether rating agencies had tightened their bank rating poli-
cies since the outbreak of the subprime crisis leading to potential changes in the infor-
mation content of bank rating signals. The Lehman incident was chosen as a cut-off point 
as they regarded it as the crucial turning point of the financial crisis. Fieberg et al. find an 
increase in negative abnormal returns post-Lehman, but only for small banks. In this the-
sis the sample size is too small to sort out small and large banks. However, it is still of 
interest to test whether the outbreak of the financial crisis affects banks of all sizes spe-
cifically in the European context. 
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4 DATA AND METHODS 
4.1 Methodological choices and dilemmas 
4.1.1 Event study 
An event study can be demonstrated graphically with a timeline divided into the estima-
tion window, event window and the post announcement period. The estimation window 
is a period over which parameters are estimated for each company. The event window is 
the period over which the event occurs, K implying the actual event day (day 0) that is 
the rating announcement day in this study. The post announcement period simply implies 
the duration of the period that may be used if one wants to follow the reaction in the 
longer run after the announcement, often up to one calendar year. It is less often used 
except for studies in which it takes more time for an event to be seen in the market (Lim 
2011, 161). Examples of these kinds of studies could include mergers and acquisitions, 
buyouts and IPOs. Post announcement effects are not examined in this study as rating 
changes have been shown to have a very short-term effects on stock prices. 
   
Figure 3 Event study timeline 
There are no clear rules on how to choose the length for each window. The lengths of 
the event window and the post announcement period depend mainly on what the re-
searcher aims to study. In some studies the event window stands for just the actual time 
the event takes place. In these cases the choice of the window is more crucial as the event 
day is not always easy to define and the main reaction may spread throughout on a couple 
of days. Thus, it may be occasionally better to use the window of [-1, 1] or [0, 1] instead 
of just the expected announcement day. Other studies, however, define the event window 
to include more days instead of just the actual event day or days. Then, the event window 
should be large enough to show any possible changes to returns due to the event (Lim 
2011, 161). The typical length of the event window in many studies is two calendar weeks 
or 10 trading days before and after the announcement. This approach has also been chosen 
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for this study. Thus, the length of the event window [T2, T3] is altogether 21 (10+1+10) 
trading days even though the actual event day still remains as day 0. However, a couple 
of cumulative average abnormal returns starting from day -20 are reported besides the 
main results just to make sure that there was not any anticipation prior to the event. 
The choice of the estimation window is more problematic as it is used to estimate the 
parameters for each company and these parameters vary over time. A longer estimation 
period may result in an improved prediction model but may cause model parameter insta-
bility (Peterson 1989, 38). In environments where the market may be disruptive and beta 
may have changed over the calendar year, a shorter estimation period may be preferred 
(Lim 2011, 161). Typically the estimation period in event studies using daily data varies 
from 60 days to 300 days. On occasion, the post announcement data is included with the 
estimation window data to estimate the normal return model. This could be done to in-
crease the robustness of the normal market return measure to gradual changes in its pa-
rameters (MacKinlay 1997, 20). In any case, it is important that the estimation window 
and the event window would not overlap. In this situation, both the normal returns and 
the abnormal returns would capture the impact of an event causing methodological prob-
lems (MacKinlay 1997, 20). In this paper the estimation period is chosen to start 260 
trading days and ending 11 trading days prior to the rating announcement date of each 
bank. This gives 250 trading days in total which is a commonly used length in event 
studies. 
The realized stock market returns are nowadays easily obtained from databases but 
there are various methods to estimate the expected returns for event studies. The most 
common way to calculate the expected return is to use the market model, which is also 
utilized in this study due to its simplicity and restrictedness (Corrado 2011, 225). 
Besides the market model, there are also other ways to estimate the expected return, 
such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the constant mean return model and 
various multifactor models, for example, the arbitrage pricing theory (APT). The choice 
of the model has been a widely discussed topic in event study literature. The choice de-
pends pretty much on the situation but the market model has been shown to be good 
enough in most cases and the differences between models are not necessarily very large 
(see e.g. Brown and Warner 1985). The use of the CAPM was common in event studies 
in the 1970s until it was shown in many studies to be outperformed by the market model 
(Kothari and Warner 2004, 25; see e.g. Cable and Holland 1999). 
The economic models such as the CAPM and APT impose additional restrictions on 
the statistical models. For instance, in the case of the CAPM, the intercept is set to equal 
the risk free rate making the variance of the error term larger than in the market model. 
With the APT, there usually exits one factor behaving like the market factor. Additional 
factors, however, provide very little explanatory power. (MacKinlay 1997, 19). Never-
theless, as many studies claim that the market model performs well enough in general, 
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and it is rather straightforward to use, it has been chosen to estimate the expected returns 
in this paper. Besides, many studies report that the difference in results when using vari-
ous models is not that notable in short-term event studies. In long-horizon studies the 
choice of the model is more crucial (Kothari and Warner 2004, 8).  
The market model assumes a linear relation between the market and security returns. 
The equation of the market model to estimate the expected return is 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡)  = α𝑖 + β𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + ϵ𝑖𝑡                                                 (1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑚t denotes the return of the market portfolio m on day t, 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is a random term and 
parameters alpha (𝛼𝑖) and beta (𝛽𝑖) are the ordinary least squares estimates obtained from 
an estimation period. Frequently, stock market indexes are used as market proxies de-
pending on the research area. In this study STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index is used to 
measure the market portfolio 𝑅𝑚t. Another option would be to use country-specific market 
indexes (see e.g. Gropp and Richards 2001). However, as the banks to be studied are 
taken from STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index, it is reasonable to use this index as a market 
proxy. 
The next step is to calculate the difference between the realized return and the expected 
return. The abnormal return (𝐴𝑅) for security 𝑖 on day 𝑡 is the deviation of security i’s 
realized return 𝑅𝑖𝑡  from an expected return 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) generated by the market model. 
   
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡)                                                       (2) 
 
After obtaining the abnormal returns, average abnormal returns (AARs) are calculated 
on day t. This is done by adding ARs up for each day and then dividing by the number of 
ARs (Formula 3). Logarithmic returns are used in this study due to their statistical prop-
erties for additive processes. The abnormal returns are trimmed at the data panel when 
calculating each AAR to avoid the averages being distorted by outliers. In the case of 
rating changes, the sample sizes are more than 100 observations and trimming is done at 
the 2nd and 98th percentiles. When the data was trimmed at the 5th and 95th percentiles, 
the results remained practically very close to the results of the 2nd and 98th percentiles. 
However, in smaller samples containing less than 100 observations, outliers have more 
effect on the results. In the case of rating watches, the data is trimmed at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles. All in all, trimming significantly affects the results so the untrimmed samples 
would be distorted by extreme outliers. 
 






                                                        (3) 
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Besides testing only single-day returns, there is a need to scrutinize the behavior of 
returns within specified time intervals. Thus, the returns must be aggregated over time. 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are simply calculated over various event 
interval periods by adding AARs up.  
 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑖=𝑡2
𝑖=𝑡1
                                                     (4) 
 
To test the statistical significance of whether the abnormal returns differ from zero, 
test statistics need to be applied. There exist numerous test statistics in the event study 
literature for this purpose. These significant tests can be grouped in parametric and non-
parametric tests. Unlike non-parametric tests, parametric tests assume that abnormal re-
turns of an individual firm are normally distributed. Parametric tests are more traditional 
and are based on the standard t-test that follows a Student’s t-distribution. (Dutta, 2014). 
When the sample size (N) increases, the test statistic approaches a normal distribution. 
The test statistics used in this study adapts the framework of Lim (2011, 165–169). 
The following formulas are applied to calculate the parametric test statistics for average 










 ~𝑁(0,1)                              (6) 
 









                                                   (7) 
 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2) =  
1
𝑁2




2                                  (8) 
 
In some papers, the variance (𝜎𝑖
2) is defined as the variance of the estimation period 
of abnormal returns. Kothari and Warner (2004), however, state that this approach of 
using only historical time-series variability may understate the true variability of the ab-
normal performance of the event window. This, because the event period may be associ-
ated with increased uncertainty. Thus, using historical data may overstate the statistical 
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significance of the event window. To overcome this problem, they suggest also using the 
event window variance. This approach is applied in this study and the variance for each 
security includes both the estimation window and the event window. 
4.1.2 Cross-sectional regression analysis 
To investigate other potential determinants of the abnormal returns surrounding down-
grades and upgrades, a linear regression model is used. The aim of the regression analysis 
is to give an idea of potential determinants for further examining and to see whether the 
results differ from past research papers. The variables in the regression represent com-
monly used variables in this research field, even though, there have not been many papers 
which study the banking industry in particular. There are not any guidelines so show what 
variables to include in the regression nor how these variables should be coded. Thus, the 
regression is unique in this matter. The regression follows the subsequent formula: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 log(MV)𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑂𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑊𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑁_30𝑖 




𝐴𝑅𝑖 = abnormal return for each individual bank on the announcement day; 
log (𝑀𝑉)𝑖 = control variable calculated as the natural logarithm representing the  
market value of a company; 
𝑁𝑂𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖 = number of notches by which each rating is changed; 
𝑊𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖 = dummy variable set equal to one if the rating was preceded by a 
credit watch and zero otherwise; 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑁_30𝑖  = dummy variable set equal to one if the rating is preceded by a rival 
rating occurring within 30 days prior the announcement; 
𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖 = dummy variable set equal to one if the rating changes between clas-
ses and zero if the rating changes within a class; 
𝐽𝑈𝑁𝐾𝑖 = dummy variable set equal to one if the rating changes within a non-
investment class and zero otherwise. In case that the rating cross the 
threshold between investment and non-investment classes, the new 
class determines the class the rating belongs to; 
𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖 = dummy variable set equal to one if the rating occurred after the bank-
ruptcy of Lehman (September 2008) and zero if it occurred before. 
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Thus, the ordinary least squares model includes seven variables in which five represent 
dichotomous variables. The market values for the first dependent variable are obtained 
from Datastream and represent the bank’s market value at the end of the previous month 
before the event. The time period for the dummy variable concerning rival ratings is cho-
sen to be 30 days in this study. This time period could also be much longer but if the 
variable has any reducing effect on stock prices, it should be more significant just before 
the rating. 
4.1.3 Problems and limitations 
Even though event studies are a common tool in finance, there are some problems and 
limitations that one must be aware of. These dilemmas cannot be solved as such, instead 
they can only be dealt with. There are problems, for example, related to the choice of the 
event date, calculating returns, statistical testing, as well as to the methodology in general. 
As noted above, the choice of the event day is one of the most critical choices of the 
event study. In many cases the choice is rather challenging and one has to use uncertain 
event dates. For instance, in studies related to dividends or mergers and acquisitions one 
has to choose between the announcement day and the actual day the action takes place. 
In some cases there could be even more days to choose between or the information may 
be available gradually. Different trading times across the world may also cause problems. 
Besides, the information is often gathered from secondary sources, such as, from maga-
zines or other media releases which means it comes with a delay. The more days one has 
to include in the event window because of uncertainty of the actual date, the lower the 
power is of the event study methodology (Brown and Warner 1980, 224–227). On the 
other hand, in the case of uncertain event dates, it is still sometimes possible to use accu-
mulated abnormal returns over a bit of a longer period in order to detect events even 
though the power of the test statistic is lower. 
The longer the event window, the more external confounding events it is likely to in-
clude. Confounding events are unwanted events that occur during a window of observa-
tion and have an impact on a company’s stock. Examples of these kinds of events include 
negative or positive news to an individual firm and macroeconomic events. Especially 
financial companies are vulnerable to macroeconomic events, such as an increase in in-
terest rates, and tend to all react to the news in the same way. Thus, focusing only on one 
industry may cause problems. Confounding events may be random or systematic. If they 
are random, and could then be considered noise, they make finding a true pattern less 
likely. However, if they are not random, they make finding a false pattern more likely. 
Nevertheless, the existence of confounding events is a problem when conducting an event 
study and there are different ways how researches control for these problems. The most 
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common methods include simply eliminating contaminated firms from a sample. The big-
gest challenge, however, is to find the true events that have an impact on companies. 
(Kwok, Meznar & Nigh 1998, 717–718). 
Taking into account this study, the choice of the event date is rather straightforward. 
The event date is simply the day the rating announcement is given by an agency. Of course 
it is possible that the data obtained from Bloomberg is not fully accurate or that some 
errors have been made while processing data. The event window is chosen to be larger 
than just the event day to see whether there exists any anticipation and whether the reac-
tion occurs immediately or with a delay. Besides the AAR for each day in the event win-
dow, several CAARs are also reported. These include the windows of [-20, 10], [-20, -6], 
[-5, -1], [0, 1], [2, 5] and [6, 10]. The window of [0, 1] is reported just in case that the 
event date is not as accurate as expected. 
The existence of confounding events is a bigger problem in this study. These are not 
taken into consideration in this thesis because of limited access to databases where this 
kind of news data is available and because of the sample size. Eliminating firms could 
create methodological problems associated with the sample size which is this small. Thus, 
in this study confounding events are not controlled except for rival rating announcement 
taking place before an event. Anyway, macroeconomic events and the fact that this study 
concentrates only on one industry are not likely to cause bigger problems. This, because 
firm-specific announcements occurred at all times of a year for a long time period. This 
reduces the impact of cyclical market trends. Thus, confounding events disrupting this 
study are most likely just random noise. In studies where the same event dates are used 
for several companies, macroeconomic events matter more. 
Just as using test statistics in general, there are two types of errors of inference in event 
studies. A type I error occurs when the null hypothesis is falsely rejected. A type II error 
occurs if the null hypothesis is falsely accepted. The test statistic used in this study 
grounds on the traditional parametric t-test and is used to test whether the abnormal re-
turns significantly differ from zero. Kothari and Warner (2004, 15–16) stress that eco-
nomic interpretation of an event study test is not straightforward because all tests are joint 
tests. Thus, event study tests are well-specified only to the extent that the assumptions 
underlying their estimation are correct. Besides testing whether abnormal returns are zero, 
event study tests always test whether the assumed model of expected returns, such as a 
market model, is correct. Also, the assumptions concerning the statistical properties of 
the abnormal return measures must be correct. For instance, a standard t-test assumes that 
the mean abnormal performance for the cross-section of securities is normally distributed. 
However, for example, Brown and Warner (1980) state in their well-known study that the 
t-test works rather well in general, at least if compared with non-parametric tests such as 
a sign test or a Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
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As noted above, the market model has been shown to be good enough in most cases. 
Nonetheless, it still has its own drawbacks. For instance, Wells (2004) states that the 
market model depends on estimates on stocks’ betas which measure the future’s variabil-
ity. In many studies, including this, the beta is estimated over the time period before the 
event and then used to compute returns around the event. Though, empirical tests suggest 
that the beta is not constant trough the time – the past is not a predictor of the future. 
Besides, a particular event could change the relationship between stock and market re-
turns. Also macroeconomic variables such as interest rates and business cycles may cause 
alterations in betas. 
The reliability of event studies may also suffer in the case of infrequently traded secu-
rities. In these cases stock prices may be biased if no trades have   been made after an 
event. Infrequently trading may cause statistical tests to be poorly specified (Cowan & 
Sergeant 1996). Also, stock closing prices may be quoted in different times that may 
cause problems. Nevertheless, the companies used in this study are highly traded and 
located in nearby time-zones so these issues should not be of disturbance. 
From a statistical point of view, one of the major concerns of this study is the rather 
small sample size. The full sample includes 321 rating announcement that consists of 200 
rating downgrades and 121 upgrades. There are no clear rules of what an ideal sample 
size is, but for statistical generalization a large sample size is always more preferred. 
When a subsample contains more than 100 observations the sample size should be ade-
quate. However, when dividing samples into even smaller subsets, let’s say, samples con-
taining less than 30 observations, the results should be taken with a grain of salt. In any 
case, sample sizes of even less than 20 observations are still often reported in papers in 
this research field. This is especially true with rating upgrades as the amount of those in 
many markets are rather scarce. 
One problem related to credit rating changes, stems from the fact that rating agencies 
renew their rating methodologies every once in a while. This leads to situations when a 
lot of ratings are reviewed at the same time. For example, in March 2015 Moody’s pub-
lished its new global bank rating methodology which affected hundreds of banking enti-
ties (Moody’s 2015). From the research point of view, these rating changes are problem-
atic as they distort study results. Even though the reasons for these rating actions are 
merely methodological, the new ratings may still have an effect on the stock prices of 
individual banks. Besides, it is not always easy to find out whether a rating change of an 
individual bank stems from changes in the rating methodology or changes in its credit-
worthiness. In this thesis the study period is rather long and it would be challenging to 
become familiar and deal with every rating announcement concerning changes in agen-
cies’ methodological inputs. Thus, these ratings are not removed in this study and are 
likely to cause bias to the study results. 
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4.2 Data 
The data set in this study is gathered from Bloomberg and it includes banks’ solicited 
long-term issuer ratings from S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. In this case, there are no differ-
ences between local and foreign currency ratings. The full sample consists of 41 banks 
from 14 European nations including altogether 321 credit rating changes from January 
2002 to December 2015. 
The sample of banks is chosen to contain the components included in the STOXX 
Europe 600 Banks Index. The STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index is derived from the 
STOXX Europe 600 Index that represents 600 large, mid and small capitalization com-
panies across 18 countries of the European region. The STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index 
consists of 47 banks from 16 countries included in the STOXX Europe 600 Index. After 
restricting the data only to issuer ratings and filtering off companies’ first rating an-
nouncements, the final sample includes the aforementioned 41 bank and 321 observa-
tions. All banks in the sample are publicly traded holding companies. The full list of the 
banks used in this study including their country and rating agency information can be 
found in Appendix 1. It must be emphasized that the data is restricted to only issuer rat-
ings. This, because issuer ratings best reflect the issuers’ overall credit quality, and thus, 
should cause a major stock price reaction. 
The STOXX 600 Europe Banks Index is also used as a benchmark model to estimate 
the expected returns. Daily euro returns for the index and individual banks are provided 
by Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream. As the total return index for STOXX Europe 
600 Banks was not allowed until 2001 and the estimation period to estimate market model 
parameters requires 260 preceding trading days, January 2002 is chosen as the starting 
point of this study. The sample includes only rating events for which there exist time-
series of stock returns for the estimation period. 
Table 3 demonstrates how the chosen banks and their ratings are distributed across 
nations. The sample is clearly biased towards certain countries. Among 14 nations, more 
than 60 percent of the total number of ratings are included in five countries (France, 
Greece, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom). Every state excluding the Czech Republic 
represent EU-15 countries. The Czech Republic, Denmark, Sweden and the United King-









Table 4 Distribution of ratings across nations 
 Country Number of banks Number of ratings % of total 
 Austria 2 6 1.9 % 
 Belgium 1 10 3.1 % 
 Czech Republic 1 14 4.4 % 
 Denmark 2 12 3.7 % 
 France 4 34 10.6 % 
 Germany 2 23 7.2 % 
 Greece 2 32 10.0 % 
 Ireland 1 16 5.0 % 
 Italy 8 58 18.1 % 
 Netherlands 1 7 2.2 % 
 Portugal 1 8 2.5 % 
 Spain 7 45 14.0 % 
 Sweden 4 25 7.8 % 
 United Kingdom 5 31 9.7 % 
 Grand Total 41 321 100.0 % 
 
Notice may also be given to how the banks are distributed over time. The time period 
contains 14 years for the time period of 2002–2015. Thus, economic fluctuations are in-
cluded in the sample. It is especially informing to scrutinize how the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis and economic uncertainty over the following years affect the number of ratings. 
Table 4 shows how rating downgrades and upgrades are distributed over the years. 
Table 5 Distribution of ratings across time 
Year Downgrades % of total Upgrades % of total Total % of total 
2002 13 6.5 % 4 3.3 % 17 5.3 % 
2003 5 2.5 % 7 5.8 % 12 3.7 % 
2004 0 0.0 % 12 9.9 % 12 3.7 % 
2005 2 1.0 % 8 6.6 % 10 3.1 % 
2006 0 0.0 % 22 18.2 % 22 6.9 % 
2007 3 1.5 % 21 17.4 % 24 7.5 % 
2008 24 12.0 % 2 1.7 % 26 8.1 % 
2009 51 25.5 % 1 0.8 % 52 16.2 % 
2010 23 11.5 % 1 0.8 % 24 7.5 % 
2011 3 1.5 % 0 0.0 % 3 0.9 % 
2012 0 0.0 % 0 0.0 % 0 0.0 % 
2013 33 16.5 % 3 2.5 % 36 11.2 % 
2014 11 5.5 % 21 17.4 % 32 10.0 % 
2015 32 16.0 % 19 15.7 % 51 15.9 % 
Grand Total 200 100.0 % 121 100.0 % 321 100.0 % 
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Figure 3 illustrates the same information more clearly in the form of a graph. Before 
the crisis there were not many rating changes and most of the rating announcement were 
positive. During the years of 2008-2010 a peak in the number of rating downgrades oc-
curred. Almost no rating upgrades were given that time. After the crisis there were a cou-
ple of calm years until the amount of rating changes increased again in 2013. In 2014 and 
2015 the amount of rating upgrades increased again after six years of keeping a low pro-
file. 
 
Figure 4 Distribution of ratings across time 
Although rating announcements between agencies are seen as equals in this study, 
there might be differences in how they affect stock prices in reality. Table 5 describes 
how the ratings are divided between agencies. S&P represents about half of the total 
amount of events in the sample. Approximately one third of the events belong to Fitch 
and one fourth to Moody’s. It would be interesting to see whether an increase in sample 
size would compensate the distribution between agencies. 
Table 6 Distribution of ratings between agencies 
 Number of ratings % of total 
S&P 152 47.4 % 
    Downgrade 93 29.0 % 
    Upgrade 59 18.4 % 
Moody’s 69 21.5 % 
    Downgrade 32 10.0 % 
    Upgrade 37 11.5 % 
Fitch 100 31.2 % 
    Downgrade 75 23.4 % 
    Upgrade 25 7.8 % 

























Various pieces of information about ratings in the sample are gathered in Table 6. This 
information is used to conduct a linear regression model to investigate potential determi-
nants of the abnormal returns around rating downgrades and upgrades.  
Rating agencies tend to give rating changes gradually, one notch at a time. This can be 
seen in the first category of Table 6. Only 15 percent of all rating changes move more 
than one notch at a time. Most of the rating changes included in this 15 percent are double-
notch changes. Only 14 observations represent cases in which the rating is changed more 
than two notches at once. 
The second category shows whether a rating change is predicted by the agency or not. 
If the rating change is preceded with a rating watch, it is named as an expected rating 
change in the table. Most rating changes in the sample were unexpected and only one 
fourth of the total amount of ratings was put on watch beforehand. 
The third category shows whether there has been a rating change of any kind by a rival 
agency within 30 days prior the announcement. If all rating agencies functioned effi-
ciently, they would change companies’ ratings somewhat at the same time when needed. 
In this case, the first agency to update the rating would probably cause a more significant 
stock price reaction than the following ones. When removing rival announcements within 
a month prior the change, rating change clusters are avoided and the sample will probably 
be a bit “cleaner”. In this study 44 rating changes are filtered off to test whether it has an 
impact on the results when conducting a linear regression. 
The fourth category makes a distinction whether a rating change occurs between or 
within rating classes. As one rating class mainly includes three ratings, most of the ratings 
occur within classes.  The fifth category, on the other hand, shows whether a rating change 
occurs within the investment grade or non-investment grade class. If a rating change oc-
curs across these groups, the new rating grade determines which of the groups it belongs 
to in the table. As it can be seen in the table, less than one fifth of all ratings belong to the 
non-investment grade group. 
The last category divides the ratings occurring before and after the bankruptcy of Leh-
man Brothers which can be regarded as the crucial turning point of the global financial 
crisis. The date of this cut-off point is 15 September 2008. As it was already seen in Figure 
3, most rating changes have occurred after this turning point. However, most of the rating 








Table 7 Descriptive information about the sample 
 Downgrades Upgrades Grand total % of total 
1 notch at a time 163 110 273 85.0 % 
> 1 notch at a time 37 11 48 15.0 % 
Not-expected rating change 139 102 241 75.1 % 
Expected rating change 61 19 80 24.9 % 
No pre-rating from other agency 166 111 277 86.3 % 
Pre-rating from other agency 34 10 44 13.7 % 
Between classes 79 44 123 38.3 % 
Within classes 121 77 198 61.7 % 
Investment grade 160 103 263 81.9 % 
Non-investment grade 40 18 58 18.1 % 
Before Lehman 35 76 111 35.6 % 
After Lehman 165 45 210 65.4 % 
 
Besides credit rating changes, the impact of rating watches on stock prices is addition-
ally studied in this paper. In total, the time period of 2002–2015 includes 80 negative but 
only 22 positive rating watch announcements. The sample does not include observations 
in which a company is put on watch concurrently with a rating change. Figure 5 illustrates 
the distribution of rating watches across time. Just as was the case with rating changes, 
most negative rating watches occur during and after the financial crisis. It can be pointed 
out that there have been only 22 positive rating watches and almost half of them occurred 
in 2015. 
 
























The impact of positive watches is reported in this paper but taking into consideration 
that it only includes 22 observations, the results should be taken as preliminary. Never-
theless, the sample sizes of either positive or negative watches are too small to further 
divide them into smaller subsets for additional tests. 
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5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Credit rating changes 
5.1.1 Full sample and overview 
Results of the full sample are displayed in Table 7. With respect to the first research hy-
pothesis, the abnormal return of -0.67 percent on the event day already provides evidence 
that rating announcements would have a statistically significant effect on stock returns. 
Thus, H1 can be rejected in the case of rating changes. As 62 percent of the rating changes 
in the sample are negative and stock prices are also expected to react more significantly 
to negative ratings, the direction of the return on the event day is not a surprise. 
Table 8 Summary of abnormal returns of rating changes (full sample) 
Day [t] AAR  Days [t1, t2] CAAR 
-10 0.18 %  [-20, 10] -0.66 % 
-9 -0.02 %  [-20, -6] -0.91 % 
-8 0.01 %  [-5, -1] -0.48 % 
-7 -0.04 %  [0, 1] -0.79 % *** 
-6 0.14 %  [2, 5] -0.11 % 
-5 -0.17 %  [6, 10] 0.71 % * 
-4 -0.13 %    
-3 -0.19 %    
-2 0.12 %    
-1 -0.11 %    
0 -0.67 % ***    
1 -0.12 %    
2 -0.05 %    
3 0.14 %    
4 0.03 %    
5 -0.22 %    
6 0.49 % ***    
7 0.26 %    
8 0.07 %    
9 0.00 %    
10 -0.11 %    




There is also a small statistically significant positive abnormal return on day [6] which 
may imply that the market mitigates the negative stock price reaction occurring on the 
event day after a few days. However, many studies have already proven that one cannot 
be sure about the direction of stock prices caused by rating downgrades and upgrades. 
Because rating downgrades and upgrades may cause stock prices to move to opposite 
directions, there is no point to further analyze Table 7. 
The analysis becomes more useful when the subgroups of downgrades and upgrades 
are separated from each other. Figure 6 demonstrates the CAARs for rating upgrades and 
downgrades over the [-20, 10] event window. The asymmetry in market reaction to rating 
upgrades and downgrades is clearly visible in the figure. While the graph of rating up-
grades does not seem to fluctuate significantly from zero, the graph of rating downgrades 
seems to anticipate the rating change, at least to some extent. The reaction to the an-
nouncement also seems stronger if compared with rating upgrades. The stock returns also 
throwback a bit in the case of rating downgrades after day 5. The reaction to rating up-
grades on the event day seems insignificant. According to the figure, it is challenging to 
further observe whether upgrades have impact on stock returns at all. 
 
Figure 6 Cumulative average abnormal returns of rating changes 
5.1.2 Downgrades 
The AARs of rating downgrades and their statistical significance are described more com-
prehensively in Table 8. To give a more illustrative picture of the AARs, they are also 





































Table 9 Summary of abnormal returns of rating changes (downgrades) 
Day [t] AAR  Days [t1, t2] CAAR 
-10 0.10 %  [-20, 10] -1.03 % 
-9 0.01 %  [-20, -6] -1.23 % 
-8 -0.05 %  [-5, -1] -0.84 % 
-7 0.00 %  [0, 1] -1.33 % *** 
-6 0.22 %  [2, 5] -0.14 % 
-5 -0.24 %  [6, 10] 1.03 % ** 
-4 -0.18 %    
-3 -0.40 %    
-2 0.04 %    
-1 -0.07 %    
0 -1.26 % ***    
1 -0.07 %    
2 0.02 %    
3 0.19 %    
4 0.06 %    
5 -0.40 % *    
6 0.84 % ***    
7 0.32 %    
8 0.15 %    
9 -0.03 %    
10 -0.25 %    
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. 
 
 


























Table 8 supports the perceptions of what was made with regard to the rating down-
grades in Figure 6. A statistically and economically significant abnormal return of -1.26 
percent exists on the event day. However, any statistically significant anticipation is not 
observed over the period of [-20, -6] nor [-5, -1]. Thus, H2 is accepted in the case of rating 
downgrades. 
 The period after the announcement, however, is more interesting. The first few days 
after the announcement are stable but the period of [6, 10] gives a CAAR of 1.03 percent, 
mitigating most of the downward reaction of the event day. Most of this throwback occurs 
on day [6] which gives a statistically significant abnormal return of 0.84 percent. Addi-
tional scrutinizing reveals that there are no particularly large negative abnormal returns 
of individual companies on that day. Only a bigger sample would reveal whether the ab-
normal return on this day is random or not. The CAAR for the whole estimation period 
of [-20, 10] is -1.03 percent even though it is statistically insignificant. Thus, it cannot be 
concluded that the event would affect the market more but slightly on the event day. All 
in all, H3a can be accepted. 
5.1.3 Upgrades 
The results concerning rating upgrades are shown in Table 9 and Figure 8. The statement 
that rating upgrades are not associated with significant abnormal returns is fully supported 
by this thesis. None of the AARs in the event window are statistically significant. The 
abnormal return on the announcement day is only 0.16 percent. Table 9 and Figure 8 show 
clearly that the variation in the event window also looks very stable and the absolute value 















Table 10 Summary of abnormal returns of rating changes (upgrades) 
Day [t] AAR  Days [t1, t2] CAAR 
-10 0.24 %  [-20, 10] -0.14 % 
-9 -0.04 %  [-20, -6] -0.16 % 
-8 0.10 %  [-5, -1] 0.04 % 
-7 -0.06 %  [0, 1] -0.05 % 
-6 0.05 %  [2, 5] -0.07 % 
-5 -0.08 %  [6, 10] 0.15 % 
-4 -0.05 %    
-3 0.15 %    
-2 0.19 %    
-1 -0.17 %    
0 0.16 %    
1 -0.21 %    
2 -0.07 %    
3 0.06 %    
4 -0.01 %    
5 -0.05 %    
6 -0.03 %    
7 0.13 %    
8 -0.01 %    
9 0.04 %    
10 0.03 %    
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. 
 
 



























5.1.4 Regression results 
Table 10 shows the results of the cross-sectional regression for both downgrades and up-
grades. Besides the intercept, the regression model includes seven variables that are re-
spectively: market value, number of notches, preceded credit watch, preceded rival rating, 
within versus between classes, investment versus non-investment grade and before versus 
after Lehman. The abnormal returns on the event day [0] are used as a dependent variable. 
As the results concerning rating downgrades reveal, the main impact is seen precisely on 
the event day. In the case of rating upgrades, no significant results are seen. However, it 
could still be possible that the cross-sectional regression revealed some determinants of 
the abnormal returns surrounding upgrades. As it can be seen from Table 10, this is not 
the case. 
Table 11 Cross-sectional regression 
This table provides the regression results based on equation 9. The abnormal returns on day [0] are used 
as a dependent variable. Besides the intercept, the regression model includes the following variables re-
spectively: logarithmic market value, number of notches, preceded credit watch, preceded rival rating, 
within versus between classes, investment versus non-investment grade and before versus after Lehman. 
 Downgrades Upgrades 
Variables Coefficients Coefficients 
INTERCEPT -0.0605 **  0.0021 
log(MV)  0.0050 * -0.0010 
NOTCH  0.0049  0.0087 
WATCH  0.0004  0.0002 
CLEAN_30  0.0079 -0.0077 
CLASS  0.0044  0.0024 
JUNK -0.0192 * -0.0002 
LEHMAN -0.0068  0.0023 
R-squared 0.0449 0.0285 
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. 
 
The only statistically significant coefficients are related to rating downgrades. The 
logarithmic market value controlling firm size and the dummy variable distinguishing 
between investment and non-investment grades ratings are statistically significant, alt-
hough only at 10 percent risk level. Some alternative variations to model the regression 
were also made but these two variables were the only ones to remain statistically signifi-
cant in most cases. 
65 
Nevertheless, the model is rather simple and aims only to give a rough idea of potential 
determinants. For this purpose the model succeeded quite well and the results seem plau-
sible. The direction of the effect seems to be what was expected for both significant var-
iables for downgrades. The values of R-squared are small which is typical in this type of 
research. 
The effect of the market value is positive in the case of rating downgrades. This means 
that the stock price reaction of larger banks is positively higher compared to smaller 
banks. Because the average price reaction is negative in the case of rating downgrades, 
the result suggests that the price reaction of larger banks is more mitigated compared to 
smaller banks. This, for example, gives support to the results of Fieberg et al. (2015) in 
the European context. It is not surprising that the coefficient is only barely statistically 
significant as the sample in this thesis includes medium size banks and not just small and 
large ones as the study of Fieberg et al. Nevertheless, the firm’s size seems to matter. 
The most significant variable is the one distinguishing between investment and non-
investment grades for downgrades. Also, the direction of this coefficient is as expected. 
Taking into account how the dummy variable is coded, it being negative means that rating 
changes within the non-investment class react more significantly. This is rather obvious 
and supported by many researchers, such as Hand et al. (1992).  
Statements and expectations behind other variables do not receive support in this case. 
There may be several reasons to explain this. First, the regression model is insufficient 
and thus unable to explain other variables. Second, the sample sizes for some categories 
are not large enough to get reliable results. For example, there are only 10 upgrades that 
are preceded by a rival rating within 30 days prior to the rating change. Third, the expec-
tations concerning other variables may be wrong or the variables could be inadequate. 
For instance, Fieberg et al. (2015) observe an increase in negative abnormal returns post-
Lehman only for small banks. If this is true, it is not surprising that the sample containing 
banks of all sizes is not statistically significant.  
5.2 Credit rating watches 
5.2.1 Overview 
Figure 9 demonstrates the CAARs for positive and negative rating watches over the [-20, 
10] event window. It is necessary to keep in mind that the overall amount of rating 
watches is much smaller compared to rating changes. The full sample includes 80 nega-
tive and only 22 positive watches announcements. The number of negative watches 
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should be adequate but the results concerning positive ratings should be taken with cau-
tion. Due to the fact that the sample size is this small, a few observations with greater 
values may control the results even if some trimming is done from the tails of the distri-
bution. 
 
Figure 9 Cumulative average abnormal returns of rating watches 
Unlike in the case of rating changes, the graphs concerning rating watches seem some-
what more symmetrical between upgrades and downgrades. There seems to be some an-
ticipation in both cases. In the case of positive watches, the anticipation starts five days 
prior to the event and is stronger compared to negative watches in the same time window. 
In the case of negative watches, the trend is downward for the whole time period prior 
the event day. 
The reactions on the event day, however, look rather slight in both cases. It is curious 
that the reaction is negative also in the case of positive watches, although, unlikely to be 
statistically significant. After the event day, the stock prices start to throwback in the case 
of negative watches. There is no clear trend that can be pointed out in the case of positive 
watches after the announcement. 
5.2.2 Downgrades 
The AARs of the negative watches and their statistical significance are described in Table 
11. For a more illustrative picture of the AARs, they are also displayed in the form of a 



































Table 12 Summary of abnormal returns of rating watches (downgrades) 
Day [t] AAR  Days [t1, t2] CAAR 
-10 -0.75 % **  [-20, 10] -3.88 % ** 
-9 -0.35 %  [-20, -6] -2.04 % 
-8 0.20 %  [-5, -1] -0.71 % 
-7 -0.18 %  [0, 1] -0.91 % * 
-6 -0.52 %  [2, 5] 1.28 % * 
-5 0.53 %  [6, 10] 0.45 % 
-4 -0.48 %    
-3 -0.04 %    
-2 -0.32 %    
-1 -0.41 %    
0 -0.82 % **    
1 -0.09 %    
2 0.39 %    
3 0.54 %    
4 0.40 %    
5 -0.05 %    
6 -0.50 %    
7 0.24 %    
8 0.25 %    
9 0.13 %    
10 0.34 %    
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10 %. 
 
 






























A return of -0.82 percent exists on the event day which is statistically significant at the 
5 percent risk level. Thus, the reaction is weaker if compared with the corresponding 
AAR of the negative rating changes. Besides, there seems to be a random negative AAR 
on day [-10] which is also statistically significant at the same risk level. Interestingly this 
AAR is almost the same in magnitude as the AAR on the event day. It is difficult to point 
out any specific reason for this observation and it rather illustrates the randomness of 
stock returns in general. It is also good to keep in mind that the size of this sample is much 
smaller compared with rating changes. Thus, random patterns are much more likely to 
occur. 
In the case of the negative rating changes, the CAAR of the [-20, 10] window is sta-
tistically insignificant. In this case the corresponding return is -3.88 percent and statisti-
cally significant. This implies that although some of the reaction was caused by rating 
agencies on the event day, most negative effects occurred on other days within the event 
window. Thus, rating watches seem to be announced during the times of critical changes 
in test companies and the market reacts to these changes before rating agencies. 
Just as in the case of negative rating changes, positive returns appear after the event 
day. Most AARs after the announcement are positive in the following ten days, although 
economically weak. Most positive returns are seen on days [2], [3] and [4] which makes 
the reported CAAR of [2, 5] statistically significant at the 10 percent risk level. Overall, 
the results concerning negative rating watches are not as clear as the results concerning 
negative rating changes. With regard to the research hypothesis, H1 can be rejected also 
in the case of rating watches. The statement of H2 is only partially correct – most price 
reactions occur before the announcement but there is still a statistically significant abnor-
mal return showing up just on the event day. 
5.2.3 Upgrades 
The AARs of positive watches and their statistical significance are described in Table 12 
and graphed in Figure 11. The results concerning positive rating watches are curiously 
enough but not very reliable due to the sample size of only 22 observations. Additional 
scrutinizing reveals that although the data concerning rating watches is trimmed at the 5th 
and 95th percentiles, the AARs are still partially distorted by a few observations with 
higher values. Naturally, trimming small sample sizes is not very effective. However, it 






Table 13 Summary of abnormal returns of rating watches (upgrades) 
Day [t] AAR  Days [t1, t2] CAAR 
-10 -0.16 %  [-20, 10] -1.25 % 
-9 -0.52 %  [-20, -6] -0.66 % 
-8 0.32 %  [-5, -1] 2.87 % *** 
-7 0.14 %  [0, 1] -0.79 % * 
-6 -0.27 %  [2, 5] 0.15 % 
-5 0.57 % *  [6, 10] -0.70 % 
-4 0.30 %    
-3 1.09 % ***    
-2 0.85 % ***    
-1 0.06 %    
0 -0.33 %    
1 -0.46 %    
2 0.12 %    
3 -0.04 %    
4 0.07 %    
5 0.00 %    
6 0.27 %    
7 -0.09 %    
8 -0.03 %    
9 -0.19 %    
10 -0.65 % **    
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10 %. 
 
 































In any case, the negative AAR on the event day is not statistically significant unless 
the return on day [1] is also taken into account. Besides, it would still be only barely 
statistically significant. The most impact is seen in the window of [-5, -1] that produces 
the positive CAAR of 2.87 percent. This CAAR is also statistically significant at the 1 
percent risk level. Thus, it seems that the market reacts to positive changes in test com-
panies before rating agencies. However, regarding these results, it is rather challenging to 
say whether positive watch announcements have any true impact on stock returns. Addi-
tional scrutinizing reveals that the statistically significant positive reaction prior the an-
nouncement results at least partly from a group of observations with higher values. Thus, 
the results are not robust enough to make assumptions with regard to the research hypoth-
eses in the case of positive rating watches. 
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6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Credit rating agencies play an important role in capital markets nowadays. Their systemic 
importance has grown especially during the last few decades. Besides the fact that credit 
ratings ameliorate information asymmetry between issuers and investors, they have a sig-
nificant purpose in financial regulation. However, rating agencies and their credit ratings 
have received plenty of criticism over the last years. For example, credit ratings are crit-
icized about moving too slowly and their ratings are said to be too inflexible (Altman & 
Saunders 2001, 6). Also, their ability to give any information of the probability of future 
default is questioned (see e.g. Hau et al 2013). Credit ratings are significant for firms’ 
operation costs so it is interesting to investigate how investors react to changes in credit-
worthiness. 
There is a voluminous body of literature studying the effect of rating changes on stock 
prices since the 1970s. Nevertheless, as the market data and methodological design used 
in this research field varies a lot, study results are often mixed and contradictory. How-
ever, there are two assumptions that a large part of researchers seem to agree with. First, 
a vast amount of studies report statistically significant abnormal returns on stock prices 
associated with credit rating announcements. Thus, rating announcements seem to pro-
vide pricing pertinent information. Second, there seems to be a trend concerning asym-
metric reaction of rating downgrades and upgrades. While rating downgrades are typi-
cally associated with significantly negative abnormal returns, the reaction among rating 
upgrades is often more limited or insignificant.  
Most previous research papers concentrate on the United States market in which the 
aforementioned assumptions are strongly supported. The results from other markets are 
often more contradictory. Even though the stock price reaction of rating announcements 
is a widely investigated topic, a very limited amount of papers exist, which focus solely 
on the banking industry. The banking sector is especially interesting due to its unique 
characteristics related to high regulation, opaqueness and global systemic importance. 
Although a couple of bank papers acknowledge the asymmetric reaction between down-
grades and upgrades, it is not known whether it is a common trend also in this field. 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine the short-term effect of credit rating 
announcements on daily stock returns for European banks indexed in STOXX Europe 
600 Banks. In practice this includes using data of 41 exchange-listed banks from 14 Eu-
ropean nations. The full sample consists of 321 credit rating changes and 102 rating watch 
announcements. Rating announcements are gathered from S&P, Moody’s and Fitch and 
represent banks’ solicited long-term issuer ratings. The investigation period of this study 
dates from the beginning of 2002 to the end of 2015. 
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The study objective is achieved by conducting an event study. The event study is ex-
tended with a cross-sectional linear regression analysis to investigate other potential de-
terminants surrounding credit rating changes. The research hypotheses and the motivation 
for additional tests are derived from past research. The main hypotheses are formed in 
order to explore; whether rating announcements have an effect on stock prices, when does 
this possible reaction occur and whether it is asymmetric between rating upgrades and 
downgrades. The additional tests include investigating the following determinants: mar-
ket value of a firm (cf. Fieberg et al. 2015), number of notches by which each rating is 
changed (cf. Schweitzer et al. 1992), whether a rating is preceded by a credit watch (cf. 
Gropp & Richards 2001), whether a rating was preceded by a rival rating within a prior 
month (cf. Schweitzer et al. 1992), whether a rating changes between or within classes 
(cf. Holthausen & Leftwich 1986), whether a rating changes within the investment or 
below investment class (cf. Hand et al. 1992) and whether a rating occurred before or 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (cf. Fieberg et al. (2015). 
The findings of this thesis provide evidence that rating announcements have an impact 
on stock returns in the context of European banks. Thus rating announcements include 
information which has not before been known in the public domain. The results also sup-
port the existence of an asymmetry in capital market reactions to rating downgrades and 
upgrades. Rating downgrades are associated with significantly negative abnormal returns 
on the announcement day although the reaction is rather modest (-1.26%). No statistically 
significant reaction is found associated with rating upgrades on the event day. These re-
sults hold true both with rating changes and rating watches. 
There is no statistically significant anticipation observed in the case of credit rating 
changes. Besides, the stock price reaction in the case of rating downgrades occurs pre-
cisely on the event day and not after. Thus, the market seems to be efficient in this matter. 
However, the price reaction of negative ratings is only temporary and it is compensated 
within the next few days. The results concerning rating changes are somewhat in line with 
the results of another European based bank study by Gropp and Richards (2001) who also 
find only a small abnormal return associated with rating downgrades on the event day. 
Besides they do not find evidence of abnormal returns over longer pre- or post-announce-
ment periods. However, they do find small abnormal returns associated with rating up-
grades which contradicts the results obtained in this study. 
The results are not as clear concerning rating watches. This is not surprising as rating 
watches are not as followed by the public as the actual rating changes. Also, the sample 
size of rating watch announcements is much smaller compared with rating changes in this 
study so the results are less reliable. In the case of negative watches, there is a precise 
price reaction which occurs on the event day although the reaction is even smaller com-
pared to rating downgrades (-0.82%). No statistically significant reaction associated with 
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positive watches if found. It seems that the market anticipates the changes in test compa-
nies before rating agencies, as there is a statistically significant cumulative price reaction 
occurring before the event day for both negative and positive watches announcements. In 
the case of negative watches, the negative cumulative price reaction is divided into a 
longer time period prior to the announcement. For positive watches, the positive price 
reaction is observed on the very few days before the event day. Just as with negative 
rating changes, positive returns appear after the event day in the case of negative watches 
compensating some of the price reaction. A similar pattern is not observed with positive 
watches. Altogether, it seems that rating watches provide some new information to the 
European bank market in the case of negative watches even though the reaction is very 
limited. 
The event study is extended with a cross-sectional regression analysis to investigate 
other potential determinants surrounding rating downgrades and upgrades on the event 
day. The only barely statistically significant variables are associated with the rating down-
grades and represent the market value of a firm and the distinction between investment 
and below investment grade classes. The latter observation is intuitive as investors are 
more concerned about their investments in lower-rated companies. Thus, the stock price 
reaction after rating downgrades is stronger in the case of non-investment grade compa-
nies. This study result is in line with the results of, for instance, Hand et al. (1992). 
A debate has emerged about the implicit public “too big to fail” guarantee benefiting 
large banks. The TBTF subsidy refers to a situation in which investors view investments 
with these banks as a safer investment than deposits with smaller banks. This subsidy 
may be seen, for example, in abnormal returns surrounding rating announcements. As the 
variable controlling firm size is statistically significant in this study, this means that the 
price reaction of larger banks is more mitigated compared to smaller banks in the case of 
rating downgrades. This supports, for example, the study results of a more comprehensive 
and universal bank study of Fieberg et al. (2015) and may provide evidence of the exist-
ence of the TBTF subsidy for larger banks. Of course it is good to keep in mind that larger 
banks are often more widely followed by the public which may also be seen in the results. 
Overall, according to this thesis, credit rating announcements seem to provide some 
modest pricing pertinent information in the case of European banks. Besides supporting 
the common trend in this research field, the results of this study may provide some useful 
abnormal return information for investors interested in the European bank market. 
However, there are some limitations that should be noticed when scrutinizing the re-
sults. First, the sample size is rather small with regard to some subgroups. Especially, the 
results concerning positive rating watches should be taken with a grain of salt as the sam-
ple size is only 22 observations. Second, the data is clearly biased towards certain coun-
tries. Thus, it cannot be said that the results could be generalized to take into account 
whole of Europe. Rather, the study focuses on certain EU-15 countries (and the Czech 
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Republic) in which some nations are more stressed than the others. As the legislative and 
financial environment varies among these countries, the results are likely to be biased. 
Also, this study does not take into account the data contamination. A rating announce-
ment is contaminated, if there are earnings announcements or other relevant disturbing 
news stories around the announcement, such as, other rating announcements. Only the 
preceding rival ratings within one month prior the event are controlled in this study in a 
form of a dummy variable to test whether this information matters. According to this 
study, it does not matter. However, the test method used in this study is rather simple. 
There exists more sophisticated methods and theories in literature on how rival ratings 
could be taken care of. All in all, other relevant news stories around the event day are 
more likely to cause biases in this thesis. 
There have been studies arguing that the reason for the rating change may matter. For 
example, Goh and Ederington (1993) state that if a downgrade results from an increase 
in leverage that will transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders, this should have a 
positive effect on stock prices but a negative effect on bonds. However, Fieberg et al. 
(2015) note that this may be unlikely with respect to banks. This, because a bank capital 
structure is typically heavily biased towards debt financing. This gives them a very lim-
ited leeway for changes in leverage which would benefit shareholders. Nevertheless, the 
theory of Goh and Ederington may still have an impact on the results. 
The limitations related to this study naturally arise ideas for further research. Increas-
ing the sample size alone would give more reliable results and allow further dividing into 
smaller subsamples. Besides, using also European banks not included in STOXX Europe 
600 Banks Index could decrease the bias towards certain countries. Also, dealing with 
contaminated data by scanning relevant news around events and removing the confound-
ing observations might improve the results. It is also good to keep in mind that compre-
hensive data cleaning is impossible in reality. 
In this thesis the data is restricted to only issuer ratings as those best reflect the issuers’ 
overall credit quality. However, rating agencies also provide a range of other ratings that 
could be used in this type of a study. Taking instrument ratings also into consideration, 
the amount of available ratings could be increased. For instance, senior unsecured debt 
remains the largest source of long-term funding for banks so its bond ratings could be 
considered as one possibility. 
At least to the knowledge of the author, there have not been many academic papers 
comparing industries in this research field. A comprehensive industry comparison focus-
ing on a specific market or even at a global scale would be interesting. For example, 
according to this study, the size of a bank matters which may give evidence for the exist-
ence of TBTF subsidy for larger banks. However, it would be useful to investigate 
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Appendix 1  List of banks used in the study 
 
Name Country S&P Moody's Fitch Issuer ratings available 
Alpha Bank AE Greek 9 - 6 2008–2015 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Italy 2 - 3 2008–2015 
Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna SC Italy 5 - 3 2004–2015 
Banca Popolare di Milano Scarl Italy 4 5 3 2002–2015 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Scarl Italy - - 2 2005–2013 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Spain 3 4 1 2007–2015 
Banco Comercial Portugues SA Portugal 5 - 3 2006–2015 
Banco de Sabadell SA Spain 3 - 1 2007–2014 
Banco Popolare SC Italy 4 2 2 2002–2015 
Banco Popular Espanol SA Spain 5 - 3 2008–2015 
Banco Santander SA Spain 6 6 4 2002–2015 
Bank of Ireland Ireland 5 7 4 2007–2015 
Bankia SA Spain 2 - 2 2013–2015 
Bankinter SA Spain 2 - 1 2010–2014 
Barclays PLC Great Britain 3 2 2 2008–2015 
BNP Paribas SA France 3 4 1 2002–2014 
CaixaBank SA Spain 1 1 - 2014–2015 
Commerzbank AG Germany 4 3 5 2002–2015 
Credit Agricole SA France 1 2 3 2003–2013 
Danske Bank A/S Denmark 3 6 1 2004–2015 
Deutsche Bank AG Germany 6 3 2 2002–2015 
Erste Group Bank AG Austria 2 - 1 2014–2015 
Eurobank Ergasias SA Greek 9 - 8 2005–2015 
HSBC Holdings PLC Great Britain 2 - 1 2004–2015 
ING Groep NV Netherlands 5 - 2 2002–2013 
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA Italy 7 3 2 2002–2015 
Jyske Bank A/S Denmark 2 - - 2007–2009 
KBC Groep NV Belgium 4 3 3 2006–2015 
Komercni banka as Czech 7 - 7 2002–2013 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC Great Britain 4 - 3 2007–2015 
Mediobanca SpA Italy 3 - - 2010–2014 
Natixis SA France 5 2 5 2002–2013 
Nordea Bank AB Sweden 1 - - 2005 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG Austria 2 - 1 2014–2015 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC Great Britain 5 - 4 2003–2015 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Sweden 3 6 - 2003–2015 
Societe Generale SA France 3 - 5 2003–2013 
Standard Chartered PLC Great Britain 3 - 2 2006–2015 
Swedbank AB Sweden 3 7 1 2006–2015 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB Sweden 1 3 - 2004–2015 
UniCredit SpA Italy 5 - 3 2014 
 
